SYNTHOS RESEARCH

The TJX Companies TJX

Consumer Cyclical · Apparel - Retail · Synthos Deep Dive · 2026-08-04

$135.14
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The Overview

TJX runs TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, Winners in Canada and TK Maxx in Europe and Australia — a little over five thousand stores. Its business is buying merchandise that other retailers ordered and then could not sell, or made too much of, and selling it at a discount. Because the merchandise changes every week, shoppers come back often to see what has arrived. The company calls this the treasure hunt and it is the entire model.

It is an extraordinarily well-run business. Last year sales were $60.4 billion, up 7%, and sales at stores that had been open more than a year rose 5% — which for a retailer of this size is very strong. Profit margins went up in all four of its divisions. In the most recent quarter, sales at existing stores rose 6%, faster still, and earnings per share jumped 29%.

On money: TJX owes $2.9 billion and holds $5.6 billion of cash, so it is a net lender, not a borrower. It earns about 22 cents of profit on every dollar of capital it employs, which is roughly three times what a typical large company manages. It gave shareholders $4.3 billion last year through dividends and share buybacks.

So why not buy it? Because of what it costs. The shares are $157.55. The company is expected to earn about $5.23 per share this fiscal year, so you pay about 30 times earnings for a business whose earnings grow around 10% a year. That is a price that already assumes everything goes right.

There is also one bookkeeping point worth knowing. Last year's reported profit of $4.87 per share included 14 cents of one-off benefit from a legal settlement about credit card fees. Take that out and the real figure was $4.73, and last year's growth was 11% rather than the 14% the headline suggests. The data file we use carries the higher number without saying so.

Our estimate of fair value is $162, only about 3% above the price. The average analyst says $183 — and remarkably, none of the 53 analysts covering the company has a target below today's price, which means there is nobody left to turn more positive. The company reports again on 19 August, fifteen days away.


Putting a number on it: our fair-value estimate is $162 against a current price of $135.14 — real upside if our numbers are right.

Our summary metrics

Downside Risk (lower = safer)4/10Moderate

"Rated 4 — genuinely one of the lowest-risk balance sheets in this batch, offset by a valuation with no cushion and total dependence on discretionary consumer spending. Supports: total borrowings of $2,878M principal against $5,580M of cash at 2026-05-02 is $2,710M of NET FUNDED CASH; interest coverage 103.1x; beta 0.623, the lowest in this batch; return on invested capital 22.1% and return on equity 59.7%; a cash conversion cycle of 28.6 days; free cash flow of $4,917M in fiscal 2026; $3.5B of buyback authority available; 53 analysts of whom 47 are positive and whose lowest target sits above spot. The off-price model is countercyclical in the way that matters — it buys distressed inventory from other people's mistakes, so a weak apparel cycle is a supply opportunity. Against that: $11,310M of operating-lease liabilities is a real fixed obligation even if it is not debt; per-store inventories were up 10% at the fiscal-2026 year-end, running ahead of a 5% comp; 100% of revenue is discretionary consumer spending; the shares trade at 30.1x forward earnings, which is 6.4% below their all-time area rather than at any kind of discount; and $13,615M of revenue (22.6%) sits in Canada, Europe and Australia with translation exposure the company quantifies at $0.01 of diluted EPS in fiscal 2026. Not a 3, because 30x earnings is a risk in itself. Not a 5, because nothing here is levered or fragile."

Growth Quality8/10Very High

"Rated 8 — the growth is real, filing-verified, and accelerating, which is unusual at $60B of revenue. Fiscal 2026: net sales $60,372M, up 7.1%; comparable-store sales up 5%; store count and selling square footage each up approximately 3%; pre-tax margin 12.1% against 11.5%; cost of sales including buying and occupancy 69.0% against 69.4%; SG&A 19.1% against 19.4%. Every one of the four segments expanded margin — Marmaxx 14.1% to 15.1%, HomeGoods 10.9% to 12.2%, TJX International 5.9% to 7.0% — with only TJX Canada down 10 basis points to 13.4%. The first quarter of fiscal 2027 accelerated: revenue $14,323M up 9.2%, comps up 6% against 3% a year earlier, diluted EPS $1.19 against $0.92. The 10-Q attributes the comp to BOTH a higher average basket AND an increase in customer transactions, which is the harder and better combination. Marked down from a 9 for two reasons: fiscal 2026's diluted EPS of $4.87 includes a disclosed $0.14 benefit from the credit-card interchange litigation settlement, so the clean growth rate was 11.0% and not 14.3%; and consensus for fiscal 2027 of $5.2348 implies the remaining three quarters grow only about 6% after a 29% first quarter, which is either conservatism or an expectation that the comparison hardens sharply."

Exponential Potential3/10Low

"Rated 3 — a compounder, not an exponential, and the file contains nothing that argues otherwise. TJX grows by opening stores (approximately 3% a year in both count and square footage), buying merchandise better than anyone else, and turning inventory 5.5 times. There is no network effect, no operating-leverage cliff, no technology slope. The single genuinely non-linear element is buying power: with 5,214 stores across four segments and $41.7B of annual merchandise purchases, TJX is the buyer of last resort for the entire apparel and home supply chain, and that position strengthens every time a department-store competitor retrenches or a tariff regime strands vendor inventory. The 10-K names the long-term store potential across its concepts — 3,000 for Marmaxx, 1,800 for HomeGoods against 1,042 today — which frames roughly 40% of unit growth still ahead at the current pace, i.e. more than a decade of runway. That is an excellent slope. It is not an exponential one, and a 3 says so."

Fair value$162 $118–$197
What does “fair value” mean?

Fair value is Synthos’s estimate of what one share is worth today, based on our model of the company’s future cash generation and the risks to it. It is not a price target or a prediction of where the stock trades next quarter — it’s the price where we think risk and reward are balanced. Above it, you’re paying for outcomes better than our base case; below it, the market is offering a margin of safety.

The model’s inputs and weightings are proprietary — they’re the product. What we publish is the output, plus an independent, public-math cross-check further down the page (“Check our number”) so you can judge it for yourself.

What do the 5 tiers mean? (Core · Tactical · Watch · Hold · Avoid)
Buy — CoreOwn it as a foundation — start or add now, size it for years, let dips be gifts.
Buy — TacticalGood price + confirmed trend + a defined exit — buy the setup, not a marriage.
WatchWe want the business, just not at this price/setup — act only when the listed trigger hits.
HoldFine to keep if you own it — no reason to buy more; new money does better elsewhere.
AvoidDon't own it — the problem is the business or the expectations, so a cheaper price won't fix it.

The Road Ahead

What we expect to matter in each window, and the evidence that would prove us wrong.

Short term 0-6 months

Neutral
Driver
"The chart is precisely neutral and the print is close. At $157.55 the stock sits within four cents of its 50-day moving average of $157.534 and 1.9% above its 200-day of $154.576 — no trend in either direction. It is 6.4% below the 52-week high of $168.41 and 22.3% above the low of $128.77, at the 73rd percentile of its annual range. RSI is 65.7, which is warm but not extended; MACD is +0.61, essentially flat. Relative performance has rolled over: three-month +1.9% against SPY +7.6%, six-month +4.9% against SPY +11.1%, while the twelve-month figure of +25.0% is dead level with SPY's +24.3%. So the outperformance happened in the first half of the period and has stopped. The second-quarter print on 2026-08-19 is the event: consensus is $1.19 of diluted EPS and $15,183.3M of revenue, which asks for only 5.4% revenue growth after a quarter that delivered 9.2% and a comp that accelerated from 3% to 6%. That is a low bar and TJX has cleared its EPS estimate in each of the last five reported quarters, by +0.5%, +8.9%, +4.1%, +2.9% and +16.7%. The risk is not the number; it is that a beat is already in a 30x multiple."
What we’re watching
"The 2026-08-19 print, and specifically the comparable-store sales figure rather than EPS — 6% in the first quarter against 3% a year earlier is the number that justifies the multiple, and a print back at 3-4% would not. Per-store inventories, which were up 10% at the fiscal-2026 year-end against a 5% comp; the 10-K flags that Sierra stores entered the consolidated calculation in the first quarter of fiscal 2026, which inflates the comparison, but the gap still bears watching. Whether the 50-day moving average at $157.53 holds as support or becomes resistance. And whether any further interchange-settlement income appears, since the $0.14 benefit in fiscal 2026 will not repeat and creates a headwind in the fourth quarter comparison."
Confidence
Medium

Medium term 6-24 months

Tailwind
Driver
"The medium-term case is store growth plus market-share transfer, and both are mechanical rather than speculative. TJX operated approximately 5,214 stores at the fiscal-2026 year-end — 3,790 in the United States including 145 Sierra, 589 in Canada, 747 in Europe and 88 in Australia — and added roughly 3% to both count and selling square footage in the year. The 10-K's own long-term store potential figures are 3,000 for Marmaxx against 2,603 today and 1,800 for HomeGoods against 1,042, which is 1,155 US stores of runway in the two largest concepts alone, before Europe or Australia. Layer 5-6% comps on 3% unit growth and mid-single-digit margin expansion and consensus revenue of $64,149M in fiscal 2027 and $67,891M in fiscal 2028 (15 analysts on each) is undemanding. The margin story is more interesting than the sales story: pre-tax margin went 11.5% to 12.1% in one year with the cost of sales ratio falling 40 basis points and SG&A falling 30, and TJX International — the lowest-margin segment at 7.0% — has more than 800 basis points of theoretical convergence toward Marmaxx's 15.1% if it ever scales."
What we’re watching
"Whether TJX International's margin keeps closing the gap to the domestic segments; it went 5.9% to 7.0% in fiscal 2026 and represents $7,986M of revenue earning less than half the group return. Whether the buyback keeps shrinking the share count at the recent rate — 1,115.8M shares at 2025-05-03 to 1,105.1M at 2026-05-02 is only 1.0% net of issuance, against $604M of gross repurchase in the quarter alone, meaning stock compensation and option exercises are absorbing a meaningful share of the spend. Whether tariffs turn from an opportunity (stranded vendor inventory) into a cost (higher landed cost on the 22.6% of revenue that is international, plus imported merchandise domestically). And whether the multiple holds: at 30.1x forward, a de-rating to 25x costs 17% with no change in the business at all."
Confidence
Medium

Long term 2+ years

Tailwind
Driver
"The long-run argument is the buying position, and it is the one durable thing here. TJX bought roughly $41.7B of merchandise in fiscal 2026 across four segments and 5,214 stores, and it is a residual buyer — it takes packaway, cancellations, overruns and closeouts at prices no full-price retailer can match, then turns the inventory 5.5 times a year. That model gets structurally stronger as the rest of apparel and home retail consolidates or fails, because every closure and every misjudged order becomes TJX's supply. The knowledge base's single relevant claim points the same way from a different angle: best-in-class retailers win on customer and employee experience rather than unit expansion as merchandise commoditises (business_breakdowns, 2023-05-01, conviction 70). The financial signature of that model is visible in the file — 22.1% return on invested capital, 59.7% return on equity, a 28.6-day cash conversion cycle, and $4,917M of free cash flow on $1,957M of capital expenditure."
What we’re watching
"Whether e-commerce ever meaningfully erodes the treasure-hunt proposition; TJX runs tjmaxx.com, marshalls.com, sierra.com, tkmaxx.com, tkmaxx.de and tkmaxx.at but does not separately disclose their size, which is itself a signal about scale. Whether the 5,200-store base saturates faster than the 10-K's stated potential implies. Succession: Ernie Herrman has led the company since 2016 and the file contains no succession disclosure. And, more prosaically, whether a business that has compounded for four decades can keep earning a 30x multiple when its growth rate is 7-11% — the multiple, not the model, is the long-run question."
Confidence
Medium

Exponential Potential

Exponential Potential3/10Low

"Rated 3 — a compounder, not an exponential, and the file contains nothing that argues otherwise. TJX grows by opening stores (approximately 3% a year in both count and square footage), buying merchandise better than anyone else, and turning inventory 5.5 times. There is no network effect, no operating-leverage cliff, no technology slope. The single genuinely non-linear element is buying power: with 5,214 stores across four segments and $41.7B of annual merchandise purchases, TJX is the buyer of last resort for the entire apparel and home supply chain, and that position strengthens every time a department-store competitor retrenches or a tariff regime strands vendor inventory. The 10-K names the long-term store potential across its concepts — 3,000 for Marmaxx, 1,800 for HomeGoods against 1,042 today — which frames roughly 40% of unit growth still ahead at the current pace, i.e. more than a decade of runway. That is an excellent slope. It is not an exponential one, and a 3 says so."

What could take this further than the base case — and where the market may be underpricing it. Full forward-growth and acceleration math in Deeper analysis, §4 below.

Deeper analysis

Technicals, fundamentals, valuation, and the full expert-claim evidence panel — the detail behind the numbers above.

Check our number Market-implied growth ≈ 60%/yr This isn’t how we calculate fair value — it’s public math you can verify yourself. To justify today’s $135, earnings would have to compound roughly 60% a year for 10 years (9% discount rate). Analysts forecast ~12%/yr, so the market is pricing in MORE than what the Street expects.

> ### Earnings in 15 days — 2026-08-19

> TJX reports second-quarter fiscal 2027 results on Wednesday 2026-08-19, fifteen days after this dive. Consensus is $1.19 of diluted EPS on $15,183.3M of revenue — only +5.4% revenue growth after a first quarter that delivered +9.2% with comps accelerating from 3% to 6%. The verdict below is set with that timing as an explicit input: we are declining a full-priced entry two weeks ahead of a print, not declining the company.


Reference table

Street consensus$182.75 (+16.0%) · median $187.50 · high $197 · low $160 — 1.6% ABOVE spot · 1 strong buy / 46 buy / 5 hold / 1 sell across 53 analysts
Valuation30.6x trailing GAAP diluted EPS ($5.14) · 31.5x ex the interchange settlement ($5.00) · 30.1x FY2027E · 27.3x FY2028E · 24.8x FY2029E · 19.0x TTM EBITDA on enterprise value excluding lease liabilities
Balance sheet — the vendor's biggest distortionVendor netDebt reads $7,259M. That figure counts $10,620M of OPERATING lease liabilities as debt. Actual borrowings at 2026-05-02 are $2,878M principal against $5,580M of cash — $2,710M of NET FUNDED CASH. Interest coverage 103.1x
Enterprise value — verified cleanVendor $182.646B reconciles exactly to the 2026-05-02 10-Q: $174.046B + $999M + $1,871M + $1,714M + $9,596M − $5,580M = $182,646M. The vendor is right and current. But evToEBITDATTM of 20.24x double-counts leases — EBITDA is struck after full rent expense, so the correct figure is 19.0x on EV excluding lease liabilities
ConvictionVery low1 KB claim across 51,928, no named speaker, does not name TJX in its thesis text. Supplementary and case-sensitive sweeps returned zero. Stated as a finding
TechnicalsWithin $0.02 of the 50-DMA ($157.534); +1.9% above the 200-DMA; −6.4% from the 52-week high of $168.41, +22.3% above the low of $128.77; RSI 65.7; MACD +0.61; 12-month +25.0% vs SPY +24.3% — level; 3-month +1.9% vs SPY +7.6% — lagging

What the experts actually said

No independent expert claims in the Synthos knowledge base yet for TJX — this dive is fundamentals- and technicals-driven, not panel-driven.

Price & moving averages 12 months · 50 & 200-day averages · 52-week range

121134147159172Aug '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Aug '2652w hi $168200-DMA 15550-DMA 153Price 13552w lo $134

Solid line = price · dashed line = 50-day average · dotted line = 200-day average · the two thin horizontal lines mark the 52-week high and low. Price above both averages is an uptrend.

Data summary: last close $135.12, 12% below the 50-day average ($153), 13% below the 200-day average ($155) — a downtrend. 20% below the 52-week high of $168, 1% above the 52-week low of $134.

Bollinger Bands 20-day average ± 2 standard deviations

124137150164177Aug '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Aug '2620-day avg 149Price 135

The shaded band widens when the stock gets more volatile. Riding the upper edge = strong momentum (sometimes stretched); the lower edge = weak / potentially oversold.

Data summary: price $135.12 is currently inside the band (band $131–$167).

RSI (14) momentum gauge · 0–100

705030Aug '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Aug '26RSI 22.7

Above 70 (overbought zone, shaded) = overbought, below 30 (oversold zone, shaded) = oversold. Currently 23.

MACD 12 / 26 / 9 · trend & momentum

0Aug '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Aug '26signal -3.7MACD -5.5

The MACD line crossing above the signal line (bars flip to the up color) = momentum turning up; crossing below (bars flip to the down color) = turning down. Bar height = the size of that gap.

Data summary: MACD is currently below its signal line by 1.78, negative momentum.

Relative performance vs S&P 500 & its sector (XLY (sector)), set to 100 a year ago

8897107116125Aug '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Aug '26S&P 500 119XLY (sector) 100TJX 99

Solid = TJX · dashed = S&P 500 · dotted = XLY (sector). A rising line means it is beating that benchmark — the sector line shows whether it is a leader or laggard within its own group.

Forward revenue & earnings actual → estimate · "FY" = fiscal year, "E" = estimate

021436485$49BFY23EPS $3$54BFY24EPS $4$56BFY25EPS $4$60BFY26EEPS $5$64BFY27EEPS $5$68BFY28EEPS $6$73BFY29EEPS $6$76BFY30EEPS $7

Darker bars = actual results, brighter = analyst estimates. Taller bars to the right = expected growth.

Key stats an RIA wants

Price$135.14
Market cap$149B
P/E trailing25×
P/E FY26E / FY27E29× / 26×
EV / Sales2.5×
EV / EBITDA17.4×
Gross margin32.1%
Net margin9.7%
Dividend yield1.34%
Beta0.616
52-wk range$134 – $168
RSI(14)8
50 / 200-DMA$153 / $155
12-mo return+-2% (SPY +19%)
Street target$176 ($145–$198)
Analyst grades45 Buy · 6 Hold · 1 Sell
FMP ratingB+
Next earnings2026-08-19 (second-quarter fiscal 2027 earnings, 15 days away; vendor consensus diluted EPS $1.19 and revenue $15,183.3M, implying +5.4% revenue growth year on year against the +9.2% just delivered). The first quarter was reported 2026-05-20 and the corresponding 10-Q was filed 2026-05-29, so the most recent filing-verified balance sheet is 2026-05-02.

1. What the business is, and how the disclosure actually works

The 10-K: TJX operates approximately 5,200 stores through four segments. In the United States, Marmaxx (TJ Maxx, Marshalls, tjmaxx.com, marshalls.com, and Sierra) and HomeGoods (HomeGoods and Homesense). Outside, TJX Canada (Winners, HomeSense, Marshalls) and TJX International (TK Maxx, Homesense, tkmaxx.com, tkmaxx.de, tkmaxx.at in Europe; TK Maxx in Australia). Chief executive Ernie L. Herrman; approximately 377,000 employees; NYSE-listed since 1987.

Store base at the fiscal-2026 year-end (10-K)

RegionStores
United States — Marmaxx (2,603) + Sierra (145) + HomeGoods/Homesense (1,042)3,790
TJX Canada (316 + 162 + 111)589
Europe (673 + 74)747
Australia88
Total~5,214

The 10-K also publishes long-term store potential, and the gap is the growth runway: Marmaxx 3,000 against 2,603 today; HomeGoods 1,800 against 1,042. That is 1,155 US stores of headroom in the two largest concepts alone, at a rate of roughly 3% of the base per year.

Segment results — the vendor's product table is EXACT, and its geographic table is broken

Fiscal 2026 vs fiscal 2025 (10-K, US$M):

SegmentFY2026 revenueFY2025 revenueSegment profit FY2026Margin FY2026Margin FY2025Change
Marmaxx$36,585$34,604$5,52815.1%14.1%+100 bp
HomeGoods$10,172$9,386$1,24612.2%10.9%+130 bp
TJX International$7,986$7,181$5587.0%5.9%+110 bp
TJX Canada$5,629$5,189$75713.4%13.5%−10 bp
Total revenue$60,372$56,360$8,089 (segment profit before corporate)

The seg_prod block sums to $60,372M for fiscal 2026 against reported net sales of $60,372M — an exact match — and reconciles in every prior year in the file. This is one of the cleanest vendor segment tables we have seen. We use it without adjustment.

Segment profit is defined by the company, and the definition matters: "pre-tax income or loss before general corporate expense and interest (income) expense, net, and certain separately disclosed unusual or infrequent items." The four segments total $8,089M against consolidated operating income of $7,178M; the $911M difference is general corporate expense. Note that TJX itself says segment profit excludes "certain separately disclosed unusual or infrequent items" — and yet the segment-margin commentary explicitly attributes part of the improvement in three of the four segments to the interchange settlement. We flag that in Section 2.

seg_geo is broken and unusable — and the break is large. The vendor supplies one year only (fiscal 2026) and two lines only: TJX Canada $5,629M and TJX International $7,986M, totalling $13,615M against $60,372M of revenue. The United States — 77.4% of the company — is absent entirely. No geographic figure in this dive comes from seg_geo; the international share of 22.6% is computed from the segment table instead.

2. The number that is not what it looks like: fiscal 2026 EPS

From the 10-K, verbatim:

> "Net income was $5.5 billion in fiscal 2026 compared to $4.9 billion in fiscal 2025. Diluted earnings per share in fiscal 2026 were $4.87 compared to $4.26 in fiscal 2025. The credit card interchange fees litigation settlement and related expenses resulted in a net benefit of $0.14 on diluted earnings per share in fiscal 2026. Foreign currency had a $0.01 negative impact on diluted earnings per share in fiscal 2026 compared to a $0.01 positive impact in fiscal 2025."

So the clean fiscal-2026 diluted EPS is $4.73, not $4.87, and the underlying growth rate was 11.0%, not 14.3%.

Two independent confirmations that this is right. First, the earnings calendar's reported actuals for the four fiscal-2026 quarters — $0.92, $1.10, $1.28 and $1.43 — sum to exactly $4.73, while the vendor's income statement quarters sum to $4.89. The gap is entirely in the fourth quarter, which is where the settlement landed. Second, the 10-K's segment commentary attributes margin improvement to it in three of four segments: Marmaxx's rise to 15.1% was "primarily driven by a net benefit from the credit card interchange fees litigation settlement and related expenses as well as favorable merchandise margin"; HomeGoods' rise to 12.2% likewise; while TJX Canada's margin FELL to 13.4% "primarily driven by expenses related to the credit card interchange fees litigation settlement" and TJX International's rise to 7.0% was "partially offset by expenses related to" it. The settlement was a net benefit in the US and a net cost abroad.

The vendor's income statement carries the gross $5,494M of net income and an eps of 4.89 with no flag whatsoever, and epsdiluted is NULL on every row. Every trailing multiple published on this company from that file is therefore struck on an inflated denominator.

The full annual record (10-K)

Fiscal year (ends late Jan/early Feb)RevenueGrowthCompsPre-tax marginNet incomeDiluted EPSDiluted shares
FY2021 (Jan-21, COVID)$32,137M−33.8%0.3%$90M$0.071,215M
FY2022 (Jan-22)$48,550M+51.1%9.1%$3,283M$2.701,216M
FY2023 (Jan-23)$49,936M+2.9%9.3%$3,498M$2.971,178M
FY2024 (Feb-24, 53 weeks)$54,217M+8.6%11.0%$4,474M$3.861,159M
FY2025 (Feb-25)$56,360M+4.0%11.5%$4,864M$4.261,142M
FY2026 (Jan-26)$60,372M+7.1%+5%12.1%$5,494M$4.87 (clean $4.73)1,128M

Note that fiscal 2024 was a 53-week year (ended 2024-02-03), which flatters its 8.6% growth by roughly two percentage points and understates fiscal 2025's 4.0%. The 10-K states it explicitly on the face of the comprehensive-income statement.

Also note the basic-EPS discrepancy. The 10-K reports basic EPS of $4.93 on 1,114M weighted-average basic shares and diluted EPS of $4.87 on 1,128M diluted shares. The vendor reports eps of 4.89 on weightedAverageShsOutDil of 1,125Ma share count that appears nowhere in the filing and an EPS figure that matches neither the basic nor the diluted number. We use the filing throughout.

3. Quarterly trajectory — and the acceleration

Fiscal quarterRevenueYoYGross marginOperating marginReported diluted EPSvs consensus
Q1 FY2026 (May'25)$13,111M+5.1%29.5%10.0%$0.92vs $0.915 (+0.5%)
Q2 FY2026 (Aug'25)$14,401M+6.9%30.7%11.2%$1.10vs $1.01 (+8.9%)
Q3 FY2026 (Nov'25)$15,117M+7.5%33.0%13.0%$1.28vs $1.23 (+4.1%)
Q4 FY2026 (Jan'26)$17,743M+8.5%30.9%13.3%$1.43 (GAAP ~$1.57 incl. settlement)vs $1.39 (+2.9%)
Q1 FY2027 (May'26)$14,323M+9.2%31.3%11.8%$1.19vs $1.02 (+16.7%)

Revenue growth has accelerated in each of the last five quarters: +5.1%, +6.9%, +7.5%, +8.5%, +9.2%. Comparable-store sales went from +3% in the first quarter of fiscal 2026 to +6% in the first quarter of fiscal 2027, and the 10-Q is specific about the composition: "Comp sales for the first quarter of fiscal 2027 were driven by a higher average basket and an increase in customer transactions." Both components positive is the good version of a comp — traffic plus ticket, not price alone.

Five consecutive beats, widening: +0.5%, +8.9%, +4.1%, +2.9%, +16.7%.

And the counterpoint, which is why this is a Watch. Consensus for full fiscal 2027 is $5.2348. The first quarter delivered $1.19. That leaves $4.04 for the remaining three quarters against $3.95 delivered in the equivalent period of fiscal 2026 — implying 2.4% growth, or about 6% once the fourth quarter's settlement benefit is stripped out of the base. Consensus is either markedly conservative or expecting the comp to decelerate sharply from 6%. The 2026-08-19 print will start to settle which, and $1.19 against a first quarter of $1.19 is not a demanding ask.

4. Balance sheet — where the vendor's headline is most misleading

As at 2026-05-02, from the 10-Q filed 2026-05-29 (US$M):

2026-05-022026-01-312025-05-03
Cash and cash equivalents$5,580$6,230$4,255
Current portion of long-term debt$999$999
Long-term debt$1,871$1,870$2,867
Total borrowings (principal)$2,878$2,878$2,877
Current portion of operating lease liabilities$1,714$1,726$1,660
Long-term operating lease liabilities$9,596$8,894$8,535
Total operating lease liabilities$11,310$10,620$10,195
Total stockholders' equity$10,403$10,190
Shares issued and outstanding1,105,051,9991,107,087,9911,115,814,224

The vendor's netDebt of $7,259M is total debt of $13,489M less cash of $6,230M — and $10,620M of that "debt" is OPERATING lease liabilities carried in the capitalLeaseObligations field. TJX has no material finance leases; it leases its stores, and ASC 842 puts those liabilities on the balance sheet with a matching right-of-use asset.

The vendor reports net debt of $7,259M. On actual borrowings, the company held $2,878M of debt against $5,580M of cash at 2026-05-02 — $2,710M of NET FUNDED CASH. We use the funded figure, and we show the lease-inclusive figure alongside rather than hiding it.

Two independent confirmations that the funded figure is the economically right one. The 10-Q's debt note lists the actual instruments — including "1.600% senior unsecured notes, maturing May 15, 2031" ($500M) and "4.500% senior unsecured notes, maturing April 15, 2050" ($383M) — totalling $2,878M with $999M current. And interestCoverageRatioTTM reads 103.1x, which is what $74M of annual interest expense against $7.5B of operating income looks like; a company genuinely carrying $13.5B of debt could not produce that ratio.

Enterprise value — the vendor is RIGHT, and this is worth recording

> Market cap $174.046B (1,104,704,446 × $157.55)

> + current debt $0.999B + long-term debt $1.871B

> + current lease liabilities $1.714B + long-term lease liabilities $9.596B

> cash $5.580B

> = $182.646B

The vendor reports enterpriseValueTTM of $182,646,185,467. The reconciliation is exact to the dollar-million, and it uses the 2026-05-02 balance sheet — not the stale annual one in bal_a. After the balance-sheet-staleness defects found across this programme, a vendor enterprise value that is both correct and current is a finding worth stating.

But evToEBITDATTM of 20.24x is wrong, and for a subtle reason. Trailing EBITDA of $9,026M (vendor, cross-checked: the four quarterly ebitda figures sum to exactly that) is struck after full rent expense, because operating-lease cost under ASC 842 runs through cost of sales and SG&A as a single lease cost rather than as depreciation plus interest. Putting the lease liability in the numerator while leaving rent in the denominator double-counts the leases. The internally consistent figures are:

BasisEnterprise valueTTM EBITDAMultiple
Vendor (leases in EV, rent in EBITDA)$182.646B$9.026B20.24x — REJECTED
Consistent: EV excluding lease liabilities$171.344B$9.026B19.0x
Consistent: EV including leases, EBITDAR basis$182.646Bnot computable from this file

We use 19.0x and note that no rent figure is available in the payload to construct the EBITDAR alternative.

Working capital is a genuine competitive asset and the numbers show it. Days of inventory outstanding 66.4, days of payables 42.0, days of sales outstanding 4.2 — a cash conversion cycle of 28.6 days. Inventory turns 5.5x. Return on invested capital 22.1%, return on capital employed 32.8%, return on equity 59.7%.

The one inventory flag. The 10-K: "Our consolidated average per store inventories... were up 10% at the end of fiscal 2026 as compared to the prior year." Against a 5% comp, that is inventory building faster than sales. The 10-K attributes part of it to Sierra stores entering the consolidated calculation in the first quarter of fiscal 2026 — a definitional change, not a demand signal — but the gap is worth watching in the 2026-08-19 print.

The vendor's composite rating is a lease artefact. rating gives TJX a B / overall score 3, with 5 out of 5 on return on equity and return on assets and 1 out of 5 on both debt-to-equity and price-to-book. The debt-to-equity score of 1 comes entirely from counting $10.6B of operating leases as debt against a $10.2B equity base that four decades of buybacks have kept small. Both sub-scores are rejected as lenses.

5. Cash flow and capital returns

Fiscal yearOperating cash flowCapexFree cash flowSBCBuybacksDividendsTotal returned% of FCF
FY2023$4,084M$1,457M$2,627M$122M$2,255M
FY2024$6,057M$1,722M$4,335M$160M$2,484M
FY2025$6,116M$1,918M$4,198M$183M$2,513M
FY2026$6,874M$1,957M$4,917M$214M$2,522M~$1,750M$4.3B (10-K)87%

The 10-K states it directly: "During fiscal 2026, we returned $4.3 billion to our shareholders through share repurchases and dividends." That is 87% of free cash flow and 2.5% of the current market capitalisation.

Capex is running at 3.2% of revenue and 1.65x depreciation (capexToDepreciationTTM 1.649), which is a company still building stores and distribution capacity rather than harvesting.

Buyback authority and the net-shrink problem. The 10-Q: "In February 2026, the Company announced that its Board of Directors had approved a new stock repurchase program that authorizes the repurchase of up to an additional $3.0 billion... TJX had approximately $3.5 billion available for repurchase as of May 2, 2026." That is 2.0% of market capitalisation in dry powder. In the first quarter of fiscal 2027 the company repurchased and retired 3.8 million shares for $604M. But shares outstanding went from 1,115,814,224 at 2025-05-03 to 1,105,051,999 at 2026-05-02 — a net reduction of only 0.96% across a full year in which roughly $2.4B was spent. Stock compensation and option exercises are absorbing a meaningful share of the buyback, and the gross-versus-net distinction matters when computing shareholder yield.

Dividend, and the standing labelling trap. The vendor reports dividendPerShareTTM of $1.755 and a 1.11% yield; profile.lastDiv is null. That $1.755 is the trailing-twelve-month total. The filings give the declared rate: the 10-K records "A dividend of $0.425 per share was declared in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026 and paid in March 2026", and the 10-Q's per-share table shows cash dividends declared per share of $0.480 in the first quarter of fiscal 2027 against $0.425 a year earlier — a 12.9% increase. The forward run-rate is $1.92 per share, a 1.22% yield, not 1.11%. Payout is 37.4% of clean trailing diluted EPS.

Total shareholder yield is therefore approximately 2.6% — 1.22% dividend plus roughly 1.4% of net buyback (using the actual net share reduction rather than the gross spend, because the gross figure overstates the return by about 40 basis points).

6. Valuation — priced in or room?

At $157.55, market cap $174.046B, enterprise value $182.646B (or $171.344B excluding lease liabilities):

Trailing (TTM to 2026-05-02)FY2027EFY2028EFY2029E
Revenue$61,584M$64,148.9M (15 analysts)$67,891.4M (15)$72,858.0M (7)
Revenue growth+6.3% (vs FY2026 actual)+5.8%+7.3%
Diluted EPS$5.14 (clean $5.00)$5.2348 (10)$5.7627 (10)$6.3628 (5 — thin)
P/E30.6x (31.5x clean)30.1x27.3x24.8x
EV / Sales (EV excl. leases)2.78x2.67x2.52x2.35x
EV / EBITDA (consistent basis)19.0x
Price / FCF35.4x
Dividend yield (forward)1.22%

Estimate coverage is good on fiscal 2027 and 2028 — 15 analysts on revenue and 10 on EPS for each. The fiscal-2029 EPS row rests on 5 analysts and the fiscal-2030 row on ONE; the latter is excluded from every conclusion.

est.ebitdaAvg, est.ebitAvg and est.sgaExpenseAvg are fabricated in this file and we prove it. Across every year from fiscal 2026 through fiscal 2030, ebitdaAvg is exactly 12.600% of revenueAvg, ebitAvg is exactly 10.727% and sgaExpenseAvg is exactly 18.877% — identical to five significant figures in five consecutive years. Independently, the fiscal-2027 ebitAvg of $6,881M is 4.1% below the operating income implied by consensus EPS and known share counts. All forward valuation in this dive runs on epsAvg and revenueAvg.

Peer context. The vendor peer set contains one true comparable — Ross Stores ($80.6B) — plus Burlington ($23.2B) and Boot Barn ($4.9B) as adjacent off-price and specialty names, and then a set that is not relevant here (Booking Holdings, Lowe's, McDonald's, MercadoLibre, Nike, O'Reilly, PDD). No peer multiples are supplied in the file, so no peer-multiple comparison is drawn. The structural note that can be made: TJX at $174.0B of market capitalisation is larger than Ross and Burlington combined by a factor of 1.7, and its 15.1% Marmaxx segment margin is the benchmark the rest of the category is measured against.

6a. What today's price assumes (the inversion)

At $157.55 — 30.1x the fiscal-2027 consensus and 27.3x fiscal 2028 — the price embeds the following falsifiable claims, each with a number and a date:

6b. The return bridge (why the multiple moves)

Expected return over the next twelve months decomposes as: diluted EPS growth (+10.1%, from FY2027E $5.2348 to FY2028E $5.7627) + multiple drift (COMPRESSION, from 30.1x to roughly 28x on the respective forward year, −7.0%) + shareholder yield (+2.6%)+5% to +6%.

Our base case assumes modest multiple COMPRESSION and we should be explicit that this is a judgement, not an artefact. Today the market pays 30.1x on the next fiscal year. Our $162 is 28.1x the then-next fiscal year. That is a genuine 7% de-rating, not the mechanical effect of the calendar advancing. We assume it because the clean growth rate is 10-11% and 30x is roughly 3x PEG — a level TJX has earned in periods of comp acceleration and given back in periods of normalisation, and consensus itself models deceleration from 9.2% revenue growth in the first quarter to 5.8% in fiscal 2028.

Almost the entire base-case return is earnings growth and the multiple is working against it. If the multiple simply HELD at 30.1x on fiscal 2028E, the price would be $173.5 (+10.1%); if it compressed to 25x, $144.1 (−8.5%); if it expanded to 31.7x — which is what the street's $182.75 implies — $182.7 (+16.0%). The street's target is a multiple-expansion call, and it should be labelled as one.

The bull case at $197 requires re-rating and says so. The bear case at $118 is 21x the fiscal-2028 consensus low of $5.600 — a de-rating to the multiple TJX carried during the 2022 comp trough.

6c. Variant perception (where we differ, what would surprise)

Synthos fair values

All three anchors are multiples of the fiscal-2028 consensus diluted EPS distribution (mean $5.7627, low $5.600, high $5.844, 10 analysts), cross-checked against fiscal 2027E of $5.2348.

Base is 2.8% above spot; asymmetry approximately 1.00:1 (25.1% down, 25.0% up). A one-to-one payoff with a base case at the current price, fifteen days before a print, on a name where the knowledge base is empty, is a Watch by construction.

7. Knowledge base — one claim, and it does not name the company

Raw hits: 1. Entity matches: 1. Text matches: 0. Case-sensitive bare-ticker matches: 0. Used as name-level conviction: 0. Discarded for collision: 0.

The primary sweep covered the entities TJX, TJ Maxx, TJMaxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods and The TJX Companies across all 51,928 distilled claims. A supplementary text sweep on off-price, TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods and treasure hunt returned zero additional claims. A case-sensitive word-boundary sweep on the bare ticker TJX in claim text returned zero. There is no homograph problem, no metaphor collision, and nothing to run a concentration sensitivity test on, because one channel supplying one claim is not a concentration — it is an absence.

The single claim, verbatim:

> 2023-05-01 · bullish · conviction 70 · skill 1.0 · horizon: principle · channel: business_breakdowns · no named speaker

> "Best-in-class retailers win by maniacal customer/employee focus over unit expansion; service and store experience protect the moat as merchandise commoditizes."

What this is, stated without inflation. It is a general principle about retail, tagged to TJX as an entity by the distiller, that does not name the company anywhere in its text. It is more than three years old, carries no named speaker, and is attributed only to a channel — the weakest sourcing the 4-lane attribution policy admits. It is directionally consistent with the qualitative case in Section 1 and it is emphatically not a view on the security.

Conclusion, stated as a finding rather than dressed up. The Synthos knowledge base has no view on The TJX Companies. Not a thin view, not a mixed view — none. Conviction rating: Very low. Breadth: 1. Net conviction: none. The absence is an explicit input to the Watch verdict: on a name where the price is full, the street is unanimous and our own research library is silent, there is no basis for a differentiated position.

8. Data integrity — what we rejected from the vendor file and why

Nine findings. TJX is a mixed file with one exact reconciliation, one exact verification, and one segment table that is missing three-quarters of the company.

1. netDebt counts $10,620M of OPERATING lease liabilities as debt — REJECTED and rebuilt. The capitalLeaseObligations field carries $10,620M (FY2026), $9,912M (FY2025) and $9,680M (FY2024), which are the operating lease liabilities from the balance sheet, and totalDebt of $13,489M includes them. The vendor reports net debt of $7,259M; the 10-Q shows total borrowings of $2,878M principal against $5,580M of cash at 2026-05-02, i.e. $2,710M of NET FUNDED CASH; we use the funded figure and disclose the lease-inclusive figure alongside. The 10-Q's debt note lists the actual instruments, and interestCoverageRatioTTM of 103.1x independently confirms that only ~$2.9B of interest-bearing debt exists.

2. Fiscal-2026 diluted EPS is inflated by a disclosed one-off and the vendor does not flag it — corrected from the 10-K. "The credit card interchange fees litigation settlement and related expenses resulted in a net benefit of $0.14 on diluted earnings per share in fiscal 2026." Clean diluted EPS $4.73, not $4.87. Clean growth 11.0%, not 14.3%. Clean trailing P/E 31.5x, not 30.6x. Independently confirmed by the earnings-calendar actuals ($0.92 + $1.10 + $1.28 + $1.43 = $4.73) and by the 10-K's segment commentary, which attributes margin improvement to the settlement in Marmaxx and HomeGoods and margin DETERIORATION to it in TJX Canada.

3. epsdiluted is NULL on every row and eps matches neither the filing's basic nor its diluted figure — REJECTED. The 10-K reports fiscal-2026 basic EPS of $4.93 on 1,114M shares and diluted EPS of $4.87 on 1,128M shares. The vendor reports eps of 4.89 on weightedAverageShsOutDil of 1,125Ma share count that appears nowhere in the filing. The same pattern holds for fiscal 2025 (vendor 4.31 against filed basic $4.31 and diluted $4.26) and fiscal 2024 (vendor 3.90 against filed basic $3.90 and diluted $3.86). The vendor's eps is the BASIC figure in FY2025 and FY2024 and an unexplained hybrid in FY2026. All EPS figures in this dive are filing-sourced.

4. seg_geo is missing 77.4% of the company — REJECTED in full. The block supplies one year (fiscal 2026) and two lines: TJX Canada $5,629M and TJX International $7,986M, totalling $13,615M against $60,372M of revenue. The United States is absent entirely. No geographic figure in this dive comes from seg_geo; the international revenue share of 22.6% is derived from the segment table instead.

5. est.ebitdaAvg, est.ebitAvg and est.sgaExpenseAvg are fabricated — NOT USED. From fiscal 2026 through fiscal 2030, ebitdaAvg is exactly 12.600% of revenueAvg, ebitAvg is exactly 10.727% and sgaExpenseAvg is exactly 18.877% — identical across five consecutive years to five significant figures. This is the fixed-ratio fabrication signature. All forward valuation runs on epsAvg and revenueAvg.

6. evToEBITDATTM of 20.24x double-counts operating leases — recomputed. Trailing EBITDA of $9,026M is struck after full lease expense, because ASC 842 operating-lease cost flows through cost of sales and SG&A as a single line rather than as depreciation plus interest. Placing $11,310M of lease liabilities in the numerator while leaving rent in the denominator is inconsistent. On enterprise value excluding lease liabilities ($171.344B) against the same EBITDA, the multiple is 19.0x, and that is what we use.

7. lastDividend is absent and dividendPerShareTTM of $1.755 is the trailing total — corrected from the filings. profile.lastDiv is null. The 10-K records a $0.425 per share dividend declared in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026; the 10-Q's per-share table shows $0.480 declared in the first quarter of fiscal 2027 against $0.425 a year earlier, a 12.9% increase. The forward run-rate is $1.92 — a 1.22% yield, not the vendor's 1.11%.

8. quote.yearHigh/yearLow ($170.00 / $128.48) disagree with tech.hi52/lo52 ($168.41 / $128.77) — we use tech. The discrepancies are 0.9% and 0.2%. The tech block is computed from the same close series that produces the moving averages and relative returns, and mixing sources would make the percentages inconsistent.

9. bal_a is annual only and therefore three months stale — stated, and worked around. The most recent balance sheet in the payload is 2026-01-31. The 10-Q filed 2026-05-29 supplies the 2026-05-02 position and every balance-sheet figure in this dive uses it. Notably, the changes are material: cash fell from $6,230M to $5,580M and long-term lease liabilities rose from $8,894M to $9,596M in the quarter.

Not defects — and two of them are verifications worth recording:

A. The share count reconciles to five decimal places. The 10-Q cover page states 1,104,704,446 shares outstanding as of 2026-05-22. The vendor's market capitalisation of $174,046,185,467 divided by $157.55 implies 1,104,704,764 shares. Agreement to 0.00003%. No share-class error, no partial-unit error, no split problem.

B. enterpriseValueTTM is correct AND current. $174.046B + $999M + $1,871M + $1,714M + $9,596M − $5,580M = $182,646M against the vendor's $182,646,185,467. Exact, and struck on the 2026-05-02 balance sheet rather than the stale annual one. Given how often the enterprise value in these files is wrong, a correct and current one is a finding.

C. seg_prod sums exactly to reported revenue in every year available — fiscal 2026 totals $60,372M against reported net sales of $60,372M; fiscal 2025 totals $56,360M against $56,360M. No double-counting, no missing segment.

Also correctly reported: revenuePerShareTTM of $54.986 × 1,120M diluted shares gives $61,584M, matching the filing-derived trailing revenue exactly; incomeQualityTTM of 1.312 correctly reflects $6,874M of operating cash flow against $5,494M of net income; interestCoverageRatioTTM of 103.1x is consistent with the debt and income figures; effectiveTaxRateTTM of 24.55% matches the filing's provision; and dividendPayoutRatioTTM of 32.7% is arithmetically correct on the trailing figures used.

Non-equity tripwire — checked and passed. TJX is common stock, NYSE-listed, $1 par value, 1,800,000,000 shares authorised and 1,105,051,999 issued and outstanding per the 10-Q. Beta is 0.623 — low, but nowhere near the sub-0.3 typical of a fixed-income-like instrument; the dividend is variable and has been raised annually, most recently by 12.9%; the 52-week band of $128.77 to $168.41 is a 30.8% range; volume was 5.12 million shares (roughly $807M of turnover). This is common equity.

9. Technicals

Today's move

TJX closed 2026-08-04 at $157.55, up $0.05 or 0.03% from $157.50. It opened at $157.13, traded $155.30 to $158.49, and closed mid-range on 5,120,832 shares — roughly $807M of turnover. An entirely uneventful session inside a market whose energy was elsewhere. There is no gap to pay for and no news in this file dated 2026-08-04. The entry price is simply the price.

10. Insiders — routine board compensation and one trivial sale

Eight transactions, all filed 2026-06-11 or 2026-06-12, all involving directors:

PersonRoleTypeSharesPriceHolding after
Jackwyn NemerovDirectorS-Sale957$168.595802
Jackwyn NemerovDirectorA-Award (deferred stock units)156.29$015,475.42
Rosemary T. BerkeryDirectorM-Exempt (DSU conversion)802$013,398
Rosemary T. BerkeryDirectorA-Award (DSU) ×4110.48 / 636.87 / 8.40 / 636.87$0various
Rosemary T. BerkeryDirectorM-Exempt (DSU disposition)802$0632.05

The reading, and it is short. There is not a single executive transaction in this file — no chief executive, no chief financial officer, no operating officer. Every entry is a non-employee director's annual deferred-stock-unit award or the conversion of a matured award into common stock. The only cash transaction in the file is Jackwyn Nemerov's sale of 957 shares at $168.595 — approximately $161,000, and executed at a price 7.0% above the current one, near the 52-week high.

What the file does NOT contain is any open-market purchase, and it does not contain any executive selling either. That is a neutral signal and it is reported as neutral. The absence of executive transactions of any kind across a two-month window is the least informative insider table in this batch, and no weight is placed on it.

11. Verdict, kill-criteria and flip conditions

Watch.

What is genuinely excellent, and essentially none of it is in dispute: comparable-store sales of +5% in fiscal 2026 accelerating to +6% in the first quarter of fiscal 2027, driven by both basket and transactions; all four segments expanding margin, with Marmaxx at 15.1%, HomeGoods at 12.2% and TJX International closing from 5.9% to 7.0%; pre-tax margin from 11.5% to 12.1% with the cost-of-sales ratio down 40 basis points and SG&A down 30; return on invested capital 22.1% and return on equity 59.7%; a 28.6-day cash conversion cycle and 5.5x inventory turns; $2,710M of net funded cash and 103x interest coverage; $4,917M of free cash flow and $4.3B returned to shareholders; 1,155 US stores of stated headroom in the two largest concepts; and five consecutive EPS beats.

What we are declining to pay for: 30.1x the fiscal-2027 consensus and 27.3x fiscal 2028 for an earnings line whose clean growth rate was 11.0%, not the 14.3% the reported figure implies — because $0.14 of last year's $4.87 came from a credit-card interchange litigation settlement that will not repeat. A base fair value of $162 that is 2.8% above spot and 11.4% below the street's $182.75. A consensus with 47 positive analysts, one negative, and a lowest target already above the price — no dispersion, no informational edge. A knowledge-base lane of exactly one claim that does not name the company. And a second-quarter print in fifteen days.

The distinction that matters. This is not a criticism of TJX. It is the observation that everything good about this company is known, published, and in the multiple — and that our own arithmetic, run independently, lands below the crowd's on a name where our research library has contributed nothing to differentiate the view. In the Synthos frame, a name where the base case sits at spot, the fair value sits below consensus, and the conviction lane is empty is a Watch by construction, not by hesitation. We want this business. We want it at a price that has a return in it.

Pre-registered KILL criteria — what would take this to Avoid:

Pre-registered FLIP conditions — what would take this to Buy — Tactical or Buy — Core:

Where TJX fits in the Synthos Framework Portfolio. The consumer / defensive-retail sleeve, at 0% today with a 2-3% target on a fill near $138 or a confirmed 6%-plus comp on 2026-08-19. On batch overlap: TJX is the lowest-beta name in this batch (0.623) and the only one whose model is countercyclical in a specific, mechanical way — a weak apparel cycle is a supply opportunity, not a demand problem. That is a genuine portfolio-construction argument for owning it at some price. It is not an argument for owning it at 30x. Logged as a tracked Synthos call (Watch) as of 2026-08-04 at $157.55.

Single biggest risk: the multiple, and there is nothing under it. At 30.1x forward earnings and 2.78x sales for a business growing clean EPS at 11%, TJX carries no valuation cushion whatsoever. The balance sheet, excellent as it is, cannot supply one — $2.7B of net cash against a $174.0B market capitalisation is 1.6% of the price. A de-rating to 25x — which is where this stock traded as recently as its fiscal-2023 comp trough — costs 17% with no change in the business at all. That is the whole bear case, and the reason a 25% downside case sits against a 25% upside case on a name where almost everything is going right.


Provenance & disclosures