KKR & Co. KKR
Financial Services · Asset Management · Synthos Deep Dive · 2026-08-04
$108.68
Buy — Tactical
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The Overview
KKR is one of the world's biggest private-investment firms. It raises money from pension funds, insurers and increasingly from ordinary wealthy individuals, and invests it in companies, property, infrastructure and loans. It charges a management fee on the money it holds — $744 billion of it — and takes a share of the profits when investments are sold well.
Two things make KKR unusual among its peers. It owns an insurance company, Global Atlantic, which brings $219 billion of money that never has to be given back — permanent capital, which is far better than money that investors can withdraw. And it owns some businesses outright, collecting their dividends.
The shares have had a very bad year. They are down 24% while the American stock market rose 24% — a gap of nearly fifty percentage points — and at the worst point they had fallen 35% from their peak. The reason is not that KKR is doing badly. Profits per share, measured the way the company and analysts measure them, have grown, and the most recent quarterly result beat expectations by 14%.
The reason is fear about private credit — the business of lending money to companies outside the banking system. Several independent commentators in our research library believe this market is in a bubble, and one makes a specific and worrying observation: the same loan is valued at 82 cents by Blackstone, 70 cents by Apollo, and 91 cents by KKR. If that is typical, KKR is the most optimistic valuer in its industry, and has the furthest to fall if reality is less kind.
Against that fear sits the clearest signal in the file. In February and March, when the shares were between $88 and $103, both of KKR's chief executives and three of its directors bought about $23 million of the stock with their own money. Every one of those purchases was at a price below today's $108.21. People who see the loan marks bought.
At $108.21 the shares cost about 15 times what analysts expect the company to earn in 2027. That is cheap for a business of this quality. Our estimate of fair value is $125, about 15% above the price. The average analyst says $133.67.
Two honest warnings. First, KKR pays almost nothing back to shareholders — a 0.7% dividend and a token buyback — so if the share price does not rise, you earn nothing while you wait. Second, the standard financial data for this company is close to unusable: the numbers you would normally check, like debt and book value, are meaningless here because KKR's accounts include $410 billion of assets that mostly belong to other people. We have thrown almost all of it out and explained why.
- Downside Risk 7/10. High beta, a 35% drawdown, credit-cycle exposure, and no yield to pay you for waiting.
- Growth Quality 7/10. Fee earnings compounding at a double-digit rate on $744 billion of assets.
- Exponential Potential 5/10. The retail channel and permanent insurance capital are genuine structural expansions.
Putting a number on it: our fair-value estimate is $125 against a current price of $108.68 — real upside if our numbers are right.
Our summary metrics
Downside Risk (lower = safer)7/10High
"Rated 7 — the highest downside-risk score in this batch, and the reasons are cyclical and structural rather than solvency-related. Beta is 1.794, the highest in the batch. The trailing-twelve-month return is MINUS 24.1% against SPY's plus 24.3%, and the maximum drawdown from peak over the year is MINUS 35.2%. GAAP earnings are violently unstable: quarterly net income across the nine quarters in the file runs $667.9M, $600.6M, $1,125.6M, MINUS $185.9M, $510.1M, $900.4M, $1,145.9M, $405.2M, $700.5M — a swing from a $186 million loss to a $1,146 million profit in three quarters, because the line includes unrealised marks and insurance accounting. The knowledge base carries four independent bearish voices on precisely the exposure that matters: private credit valuation. `forward_guidance`'s observation that the same loan is marked at 82 by Blackstone, 70 by Apollo and 91 by KKR is a specific, checkable allegation about the highest mark in the peer set being KKR's. Global Atlantic adds $219 billion of insurance AUM whose economics are a spread between investment income and policyholder costs — that is credit risk with a duration mismatch, not fee income. The offsets are real: $744 billion of AUM, a large share of it locked-up capital that cannot redeem; management fees that accrue regardless of marks; a newly-signed $3.0 billion unsecured revolver maturing 2031; and $23.2 million of open-market insider buying by people who see the marks. But there is almost no shareholder-yield cushion — the dividend is 0.69% and fiscal 2025 repurchases were $122.9 million, 0.13% of market capitalisation. If the multiple does not cooperate, nothing else pays you to wait."
Growth Quality7/10High
"Rated 7 — genuine, fee-driven, and considerably steadier than the GAAP earnings line suggests. Assets under management reached $744 billion at 2025-12-31, of which $219 billion sits at Global Atlantic. The K-Series retail vehicles reached $38 billion of AUM at 2026-03-31 and the 10-Q notes this 'has grown significantly over the past three years' — that is the retail-distribution shift the knowledge base's one structural bull claim describes. Adjusted net income per share, which is what KKR and every analyst in this file actually forecast, ran $1.41, $1.12, $1.39 and $1.63 across the last four reported quarters — a trailing $5.55 — with beats of 8.5%, MINUS 1.8%, 10.3% and 14.0%. Consensus wants $6.213 in FY2026 (10 analysts) and $7.334 in FY2027 (11) — 18.0% growth — and $8.487 in FY2028, though that rests on only 2 analysts and is used for cross-check only. The 10-Q attributes the March-quarter fee-related-earnings increase to 'a higher level of management fees across our Private Equity, Real Assets, and Credit and Liquid Strategies business lines' plus higher fee-related performance revenues in Real Assets, offset by lower Capital Markets transaction fees. Three reportable segments now: Asset Management, Insurance (Global Atlantic) and Strategic Holdings, the last of which holds operating companies outright and earns dividends. What holds this at 7: roughly half of forward earnings growth depends on realisations and performance income, which are market-dependent, and the FY2028 and FY2029 estimate rows are 2- and 1-analyst extrapolations that tell you nothing."
Exponential Potential5/10Moderate
"Rated 5 — the highest exponential score in this batch, and it rests on two genuine structural shifts rather than on a technology curve. FIRST, the retail channel. Alternative assets have historically been sold to institutions; the K-Series vehicles reached $38 billion of AUM at 2026-03-31 from a standing start three years ago, and the knowledge base's one structural bull (`real_vision`, 2024-09-04) frames it precisely: 'Alt managers target retail because defined-benefit pools are shrinking while US retail wealth grows ~13-17% annually — a structural distribution shift.' If alternatives go from roughly nothing to a mid-single-digit share of retail portfolios, the addressable fee pool multiplies without KKR investing more capital, which is the definition of operating leverage on a fee base. SECOND, Global Atlantic. Owning a $219 billion insurance balance sheet gives KKR permanent, non-redeemable capital to deploy into its own credit origination and to earn a spread on — that is a structurally different asset from a fund manager renting capital in three-to-ten-year lockups, and it is why the balance sheet is $410 billion. Strategic Holdings, which owns operating companies outright and collects dividends, is a third and smaller version of the same idea. Against that: none of this compounds like software. Fee rates compress, performance income is cyclical, and the insurance spread is a credit bet that widens and narrows with the cycle. A 5: two real structural expansions of the addressable pool, attached to a business whose earnings will always be levered to asset prices."
Fair value$125 $82–$165
What does “fair value” mean?
Fair value is Synthos’s estimate of what one share is worth today, based on our model of the company’s future cash generation and the risks to it. It is not a price target or a prediction of where the stock trades next quarter — it’s the price where we think risk and reward are balanced. Above it, you’re paying for outcomes better than our base case; below it, the market is offering a margin of safety.
The model’s inputs and weightings are proprietary — they’re the product. What we publish is the output, plus an independent, public-math cross-check further down the page (“Check our number”) so you can judge it for yourself.
What do the 5 tiers mean? (Core · Tactical · Watch · Hold · Avoid)
Buy — CoreOwn it as a foundation — start or add now, size it for years, let dips be gifts.
Buy — TacticalGood price + confirmed trend + a defined exit — buy the setup, not a marriage.
WatchWe want the business, just not at this price/setup — act only when the listed trigger hits.
HoldFine to keep if you own it — no reason to buy more; new money does better elsewhere.
AvoidDon't own it — the problem is the business or the expectations, so a cheaper price won't fix it.
The Road Ahead
What we expect to matter in each window, and the evidence that would prove us wrong.
Short term 0-6 months
Tailwind- Driver
- "A stock recovering off a deep low with the insiders already in. KKR closed 2026-08-04 at $108.21, up 1.55%, which is 27.5% BELOW its 52-week high of $149.34 but 29.0% ABOVE its low of $83.88, 12.2% above a 50-day average of $96.47 and 1.1% above a 200-day average of $107.01 — the shorter average is rising steeply and the price has just reclaimed the longer one. RSI is 62.6 and MACD is +2.38, both constructive. The maximum drawdown from peak over the trailing year was 35.2%, so the recovery is off a genuine washout rather than a shallow dip. Three-month return is +4.7% against SPY's +7.6% — still lagging, but the six-month figure of MINUS 5.4% against SPY's +11.1% and the twelve-month figure of MINUS 24.1% against +24.3% show how much ground has been given up. Underneath, the 2026-07-30 print beat consensus by 14.0%, the largest of the four quarters in the file. And in February and March 2026, at prices between $87.81 and $103.17, both co-chief executives and three directors bought roughly $23.2 million of stock in the open market — every purchase below today's price. What tempers the stance: this is a high-beta name (1.794) whose short-term direction is set by credit spreads and equity markets far more than by anything KKR does, and there is essentially no dividend or buyback to pay you for waiting."
- What we’re watching
- "The 2026-11-06 print against consensus adjusted net income per share of $1.57 and segment revenue of $2,738M. Within it, four things matter more than the headline: fee-related earnings and the management-fee line, which is the recurring, non-market-dependent part of the business; realised performance income, which is the volatile part and which the 10-Q shows came in the March quarter from named exits (Novaria Group, BrightSpring Health Services, J.B. Chemicals, Crosby Group); the K-Series retail AUM number, $38 billion at 2026-03-31, which is the cleanest single measure of the structural distribution thesis; and any disclosure about private-credit marks, given the knowledge base's specific allegation that KKR carries the highest mark in the peer group on a commonly-held loan. Also watch whether the insider buying that clustered in February and March resumes, pauses, or reverses — six open-market purchases by five people is a pattern, and its continuation or cessation is information."
- Confidence
- Medium
Medium term 6-24 months
Tailwind- Driver
- "The medium term is a re-rating case, and the arithmetic is unusually clean because the starting multiple is unusually low. Consensus adjusted net income per share is $6.213 in FY2026 and $7.334 in FY2027 — 18.0% growth — against a current price of $108.21, which is 17.4x and 14.8x. An alternative asset manager with $744 billion of AUM growing fee-related earnings at a double-digit rate has not historically traded at 14.8x its second forward year; it has traded in the high teens to low twenties. Our base of $125 assumes 17x FY2027, which is not a heroic assumption — it is the multiple the stock carried before the drawdown. The mechanism has three parts. Fee-related earnings compound with AUM and are largely insulated from marks. Global Atlantic's $219 billion insurance balance sheet earns a spread that widens with credit origination volume. And Strategic Holdings converts owned operating companies into a dividend stream. The offset, and it is large: the return has to come almost entirely from the multiple and from earnings, because the dividend is 0.69% and fiscal 2025 buybacks were $122.9 million — 0.13% of market capitalisation. Total shareholder yield is under 1%, against roughly 5% at McKesson and 7% at Capital One in this same batch."
- What we’re watching
- "Whether private-credit marks hold. This is the pivotal question for the name and the knowledge base has raised it in a specific, checkable form: `forward_guidance` (2025-11-14) reports the same loan marked at 82 by Blackstone, 70 by Apollo and 91 by KKR. If that is representative, KKR is the most optimistic marker in the peer set and has the furthest to fall in a repricing. Whether Global Atlantic's spread holds as its investment portfolio reprices — $219 billion of insurance AUM is a third of the firm's total and it is a credit bet with a duration mismatch. Whether K-Series retail AUM keeps compounding past $38 billion, which is the single cleanest test of the structural thesis. Whether realisations recover: performance income depends on exits, and the March quarter's came from four named private-equity sales. Whether the newly-signed $3.0 billion unsecured revolver (2026-07-30, maturing 2031, guaranteed by KKR & Co. Inc.) stays undrawn. And whether management converts any of its balance-sheet capacity into a buyback of consequence — at 14.8x forward with the co-CEOs buying personally, the absence of a corporate repurchase programme of scale is the most conspicuous gap in the capital-allocation story."
- Confidence
- Medium
Long term 2+ years
Neutral- Driver
- "Long-run, the question is whether the alternative asset management model survives its own success. KKR has grown from a US buyout firm to $744 billion of AUM across 36 offices, and the growth has come by adding balance sheet — Global Atlantic's $219 billion, Strategic Holdings' owned operating companies, consolidated financing entities — rather than purely by adding fee-paying third-party capital. That changes what the equity is: a fee stream with a call option has become a fee stream attached to a levered credit portfolio. The bull reading is that permanent capital is strictly better than lockup capital, that it lets KKR originate credit it can hold, and that the retail channel multiplies the addressable pool. The bear reading is the one four independent voices in the knowledge base give: that private credit is in a bubble, that marks across the industry are inconsistent, and that a firm carrying the highest marks has the most to give back. Both readings are consistent with everything in the filings, which is why the long-horizon stance is neutral rather than either. Governance is a genuine strength and an unresolved question in equal measure: Henry Kravis and George Roberts remain on a board re-elected on 2026-05-29 by KKR Management LLP rather than by public shareholders, and Joseph Bae and Scott Nuttall are the co-chief executives — both of whom bought stock in February and March."
- What we’re watching
- "Whether the private-credit cycle turns, and what KKR's marks do when it does — that is the single question on which the long-run outcome rests. Whether the retail channel reaches a scale that changes the fee-pool mathematics, or stalls somewhere below it. Whether the consolidated balance sheet ever becomes a liability rather than an accounting nuisance: the 10-Q states plainly that consolidated financing entity debt is 'non-recourse to KKR beyond the assets of the CFE', which is exactly right and exactly the sentence that stops being reassuring in a genuine credit event. Whether Global Atlantic's reserves prove adequate through a full cycle — the acquisition closed in 2021 and has not been tested. Whether the co-CEO structure holds, and what succession looks like beyond Kravis and Roberts, whose founder-succession execution the knowledge base's one neutral claim identifies as the variable that differentiates alt managers. And whether fee rates compress as alternatives commoditise, which is the slow, boring risk that does more damage over a decade than any single credit event."
- Confidence
- Low
Exponential Potential
Exponential Potential5/10Moderate
"Rated 5 — the highest exponential score in this batch, and it rests on two genuine structural shifts rather than on a technology curve. FIRST, the retail channel. Alternative assets have historically been sold to institutions; the K-Series vehicles reached $38 billion of AUM at 2026-03-31 from a standing start three years ago, and the knowledge base's one structural bull (`real_vision`, 2024-09-04) frames it precisely: 'Alt managers target retail because defined-benefit pools are shrinking while US retail wealth grows ~13-17% annually — a structural distribution shift.' If alternatives go from roughly nothing to a mid-single-digit share of retail portfolios, the addressable fee pool multiplies without KKR investing more capital, which is the definition of operating leverage on a fee base. SECOND, Global Atlantic. Owning a $219 billion insurance balance sheet gives KKR permanent, non-redeemable capital to deploy into its own credit origination and to earn a spread on — that is a structurally different asset from a fund manager renting capital in three-to-ten-year lockups, and it is why the balance sheet is $410 billion. Strategic Holdings, which owns operating companies outright and collects dividends, is a third and smaller version of the same idea. Against that: none of this compounds like software. Fee rates compress, performance income is cyclical, and the insurance spread is a credit bet that widens and narrows with the cycle. A 5: two real structural expansions of the addressable pool, attached to a business whose earnings will always be levered to asset prices."
What could take this further than the base case — and where the market may be underpricing it. Full forward-growth and acceleration math in Deeper analysis, §4 below.
Deeper analysis
Technicals, fundamentals, valuation, and the full expert-claim evidence panel — the detail behind the numbers above.
Reference table
| Street consensus | $133.67 (+23.5%) · median $126 (+16.4%) · high $187 (+72.8%) · low $116, 7.2% ABOVE spot · 24 buy / 3 hold / 0 sell across 27 analysts. Our base sits 6.5% BELOW consensus and essentially AT the median |
| Valuation — the right basis | 19.5x trailing adjusted net income per share ($5.55) · 17.4x FY2026E · 14.8x FY2027E · 12.8x FY2028E (2 analysts — cross-check only) |
| Valuation — the vendor's basis, and why it is discarded | GAAP priceToEarningsRatioTTM 32.2x and priceToEarningsDilutedRatioTTM 34.0x, on a GAAP net income line that swung from a −$186M loss to a +$1,146M profit in three quarters. Neither KKR nor any analyst in this file forecasts GAAP EPS |
| Scale | $744 billion of AUM at 2025-12-31, of which $219 billion at Global Atlantic · K-Series retail AUM $38 billion at 2026-03-31 · 5,043 employees, 36 offices |
| Capital return — and its absence | Dividend $0.75 TTM, 0.69% yield, 26.0% payout · fiscal 2025 repurchases $122.9 million — 0.13% of market capitalisation. Total shareholder yield is under 1% |
| Enterprise value, net debt, book value | ALL REJECTED as structurally inapplicable. The $410B balance sheet consolidates Global Atlantic and third-party financing entities; $50.7B of the $81.6B of total equity is noncontrolling interests; the 10-Q states CFE debt is "non-recourse to KKR beyond the assets of the CFE" |
| Conviction | Low and NET BEARISH — 9 raw KB hits, 6 used, 3 discarded; 4 of the 6 are bearish, across 5 distinct channels. Concentration test passes |
| Technicals | −27.5% from the 52-week high of $149.34; +29.0% above the low of $83.88; +12.2% above the 50-DMA ($96.47) and +1.1% above the 200-DMA ($107.01); RSI 62.6; MACD +2.38; max drawdown −35.2%; 12-month −24.1% vs SPY +24.3% |
What the experts actually said 5 traceable claims on KKR · showing the highest-conviction voices
“KKR is a phenomenal company to own — but only after the next round of QE, since money-printing lifts the financialized economy's financial sector.”
“Private credit managers like Blue Owl and KKR exhibit bubble behavior; Blue Owl's loud protests only draw more attention to the bubble.”
Every claim reconciles to a real claim_id in the Synthos knowledge base — this is the evidence the verdict is built on, not vibes. Management (the company itself) is shown but half-weighted; one cautionary voice is included on purpose.
Price & moving averages 12 months · 50 & 200-day averages · 52-week range
Solid line = price · dashed line = 50-day average · dotted line = 200-day average · the two thin horizontal lines mark the 52-week high and low. Price above both averages is an uptrend.
Data summary: last close $108.68, 7% above the 50-day average ($101), 3% above the 200-day average ($106) — an uptrend. 27% below the 52-week high of $149, 30% above the 52-week low of $84.
Bollinger Bands 20-day average ± 2 standard deviations
The shaded band widens when the stock gets more volatile. Riding the upper edge = strong momentum (sometimes stretched); the lower edge = weak / potentially oversold.
Data summary: price $108.68 is currently inside the band (band $102–$114).
RSI (14) momentum gauge · 0–100
Above 70 (overbought zone, shaded) = overbought, below 30 (oversold zone, shaded) = oversold. Currently 55.
MACD 12 / 26 / 9 · trend & momentum
The MACD line crossing above the signal line (bars flip to the up color) = momentum turning up; crossing below (bars flip to the down color) = turning down. Bar height = the size of that gap.
Data summary: MACD is currently below its signal line by 0.46, negative momentum.
Relative performance vs S&P 500 & its sector (XLF (sector)), set to 100 a year ago
Solid = KKR · dashed = S&P 500 · dotted = XLF (sector). A rising line means it is beating that benchmark — the sector line shows whether it is a leader or laggard within its own group.
Forward revenue & earnings actual → estimate · "FY" = fiscal year, "E" = estimate
Darker bars = actual results, brighter = analyst estimates. Taller bars to the right = expected growth.
Key stats an RIA wants
Price$108.68
Market cap$98B
P/E trailing31×
P/E FY26E / FY27E17× / 15×
EV / Sales6.5×
EV / EBITDA14.6×
Gross margin46.5%
Net margin14.9%
Dividend yield0.70%
Beta1.786
52-wk range$84 – $149
RSI(14)58
50 / 200-DMA$101 / $106
12-mo return+-23% (SPY +19%)
Street target$127 ($116–$147)
Analyst grades24 Buy · 3 Hold · 0 Sell
FMP ratingC-
Next earnings2026-11-06 (Q3 2026 earnings, 94 days away; vendor consensus adjusted net income per share $1.57 and segment revenue $2,738M). Second-quarter results were released 2026-07-30, five days before this dive, and beat the consensus estimate by 14.0% ($1.63 against $1.43) on segment revenue of $2,763M against $2,548M estimated (+8.4%).
1. What the business is — three segments and a very large balance sheet
KKR & Co. Inc. is a Delaware corporation with approximately 5,043 employees (the 10-K gives roughly 4,200 across asset management plus approximately 800 in a subsidiary organisation), 36 offices worldwide, and Joseph Y. Bae and Scott C. Nuttall as co-chief executives. Henry R. Kravis and George R. Roberts remain on the board, which was re-elected on 2026-05-29 by KKR Management LLP under Section 3.02 of the bylaws rather than by public shareholders.
Scale, from the 10-K: "As of December 31, 2025, we managed $744 billion of assets under management, of which $219 billion comes from Global Atlantic."
Three reportable segments, from the March 2026 10-Q, and the chief operating decision makers are the co-CEOs:
| Segment | What it is | How it makes money |
|---|---|---|
| Asset Management | Investment management for funds, vehicles and accounts — "including the Insurance and Strategic Holdings segments" — plus capital markets services to portfolio companies and third parties | Management fees, fee-related performance revenues, transaction fees, realised performance income (carry) |
| Insurance | Global Atlantic, "a leading U.S. retirement and life insurance company... protection, legacy and savings products and reinsurance solutions" | "primarily generates income by earning a spread between its investment income and the cost of policyholder benefits" |
| Strategic Holdings | "acquires and manages interests in operating companies that are owned by KKR" | "primarily generates income from dividends from these businesses," presented net of management fees paid to Asset Management |
Note the structure carefully, because it is the reason every consolidated ratio in the vendor file is wrong. The Asset Management segment charges fees to the Insurance and Strategic Holdings segments, which are themselves consolidated. Global Atlantic's insurance liabilities, and the debt of consolidated collateralised financing entities holding third-party money, sit on the same balance sheet as KKR's own corporate obligations. The result is $410 billion of total assets and $81.6 billion of total equity of which $50.7 billion — 62% — belongs to noncontrolling interests.
The 10-Q says so in terms that settle the matter:
> "consolidated CFEs issue debt securities to third-party investors which are collateralized by assets held by the CFE. Debt securities issued by CFEs are supported solely by the assets held at the CFEs and are not collateralized by assets of any other KKR entity... The CFE's debt obligations are non-recourse to KKR beyond the assets of the CFE."
And separately:
> "investments and other assets held directly by majority-owned consolidated levered investment vehicles and other entities have been funded with borrowings that are collateralized by the investments and assets they own. These borrowings are non-recourse to KKR beyond the investments or assets serving as collateral or the capital that KKR has committed to fund such investment vehicles."
A vendor netDebt of $54.76 billion and an enterpriseValueTTM of $142.7 billion are therefore not merely imprecise for this company — they are measuring a quantity that does not exist. Section 8 sets out the full rejection.
The one part of the structure that is genuinely new and genuinely interesting is the retail channel. From the 10-Q: "March 31, 2026, total K-Series AUM was $38 billion, which has grown significantly over the past three years." That is the single cleanest quantitative measure of the structural distribution thesis in this dive, and it appears nowhere in the vendor payload.
2. Earnings — two entirely different numbers, and only one of them is used
KKR reports GAAP net income and a suite of non-GAAP segment measures, and the gap between them is enormous. Every analyst in this file forecasts the non-GAAP number.
The GAAP line, from inc_q, is not usable as a trend:
| Quarter | GAAP revenue | GAAP net income |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 2024 | $4,108M | $668M |
| Q3 2024 | $4,732M | $601M |
| Q4 2024 | $3,200M | $1,126M |
| Q1 2025 | $3,055M | −$186M |
| Q2 2025 | $5,003M | $510M |
| Q3 2025 | $5,465M | $900M |
| Q4 2025 | $5,521M | $1,146M |
| Q1 2026 | $4,002M | $405M |
| Q2 2026 | $6,130M | $700M |
A loss of $186 million becoming a profit of $1,146 million three quarters later, on revenue that moved from $3,055M to $5,521M, is not an operating trend — it is mark-to-market accounting on a consolidated investment portfolio. GAAP revenue for this company includes investment gains and losses on assets that largely belong to third parties. The vendor's priceToEarningsRatioTTM of 32.2x and priceToEarningsDilutedRatioTTM of 34.0x are computed on that line and are not used anywhere in this dive.
The measure KKR and the street actually use — adjusted net income per share:
| Report date | Quarter | Adjusted net income per share | estimate | beat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-31 | Q2 2025 | $1.18 | $1.14 | +3.5% |
| 2025-11-07 | Q3 2025 | $1.41 | $1.30 | +8.5% |
| 2026-02-05 | Q4 2025 | $1.12 | $1.14 | −1.8% |
| 2026-05-05 | Q1 2026 | $1.39 | $1.26 | +10.3% |
| 2026-07-30 | Q2 2026 | $1.63 | $1.43 | +14.0% |
| 2026-11-06 | Q3 2026 | ? | $1.57 | — |
Trailing four quarters: $1.41 + $1.12 + $1.39 + $1.63 = $5.55. At $108.21 that is 19.5x trailing. Four beats in five quarters, and the two most recent are the two largest.
The 10-Q's own explanation of the March-quarter improvement, verbatim: fee-related earnings rose "primarily due to (i) a higher level of management fees across our Private Equity, Real Assets, and Credit and Liquid Strategies business lines and (ii) a higher level of fee related performance revenues primarily earned in our Real Assets business line, partially offset by (i) a higher level of fee related compensation and other operating expenses and (ii) a lower level of transaction fees earned in our Capital Markets business line."
And the composition of realised performance income is worth reading, because it is the volatile half of the earnings. The March quarter's private-equity realisations came from "the sale of our investments in Novaria Group (industrial sector) and BrightSpring Health Services (NASDAQ: BTSG) held by Americas Fund XII, J.B. Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited (healthcare sector) held by Asian Fund III, and Crosby Group (manufacturing sector) held by North America Fund XI." Four named exits produced a large share of one quarter's performance income. That is what makes this earnings stream lumpy, and it is why the fee-related line matters more than the headline.
3. Valuation — priced in or room?
At $108.21 (market capitalisation $97.16B, implied 897.9M shares):
| Trailing | FY2026E | FY2027E | FY2028E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted net income per share | $5.55 | $6.213 (10) | $7.334 (11) | $8.487 (2) |
| Growth | — | — | +18.0% | +15.7% |
| P/E (adjusted basis) | 19.5x | 17.4x | 14.8x | 12.8x |
| GAAP P/E (rejected) | 32.2x / 34.0x | — | — | — |
| Dividend yield | 0.69% | — | — | — |
| Total shareholder yield | <1% | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA, price/book, net debt/EBITDA | ALL REJECTED — see Section 8 | — | — | — |
Estimate coverage is adequate on the two near years and collapses immediately after. Eleven analysts on FY2027 adjusted EPS and ten on FY2026 — but only 2 on FY2028 and 1 on FY2029. The FY2028 row is used for cross-check only and the FY2029 row is excluded from every conclusion. The FY2027 range is $6.872 to $7.579, a 10.3% spread.
est.ebitdaAvg and est.ebitAvg fail three separate tests and are rejected outright. They are identical to the dollar in five of eight years (FY2029, FY2028, FY2027, FY2026 and FY2022 all show ebitdaAvg exactly equal to ebitAvg), which is arithmetically impossible for a company with $8.78 billion of intangibles. In FY2023, ebitAvg of $3,488.5M EXCEEDS ebitdaAvg of $2,967.6M — the impossible-ordering defect measured at 8.9% of files across the programme. And both carry the fixed-ratio signature: ebitdaAvg is exactly 52.573% of revenueAvg in FY2026, FY2027, FY2028 and FY2029 alike. All forward valuation uses epsAvg.
est.revenueAvg is separately unusable and is not used at all. The array runs $10,589M (FY2026), $12,476M (FY2027), $16,580M (FY2028), then $9,738M (FY2029) — a 41% decline that no analyst forecast. It is also on a segment-revenue basis roughly 2.4x below the GAAP revenue in inc_a ($7,911M estimated for FY2025 against $19,262M reported). Two different revenue definitions live in the same payload and neither is labelled.
Peer context is unusually good for once. The vendor set contains Apollo ($76.8B), Ares ($46.9B), Blackstone ($108.1B), Brookfield Asset Management ($82.9B), Brookfield Corp ($99.7B), Carlyle ($18.2B), Blue Owl ($18.1B) and TPG ($18.8B) — eight genuine alternative-asset-manager comparables, the cleanest peer block in this batch. BlackRock, T. Rowe Price, AMG, Ares Capital and Carlyle Secured Lending are traditional managers or BDCs and are less apposite. At $97.2 billion KKR sits between Apollo and Blackstone in market capitalisation, and Blackstone at $137.20 is the closest structural comparable. We draw no cross-multiple because we hold no equivalent adjusted-earnings data for the peers in this file, and we say so rather than inventing one.
3a. What today's price assumes (the inversion)
At $108.21 — 17.4x FY2026 consensus adjusted net income per share, 14.8x FY2027 — the price embeds:
- Adjusted net income per share reaches $6.213 in 2026 and $7.334 in 2027. (Consensus; 10 and 11 analysts.) The first half of 2026 delivered $3.02 ($1.39 + $1.63), so FY2026 needs $3.19 in the second half — a 5.6% step, consistent with the $1.57 September guide.
- Private-credit marks hold, and KKR's are not systematically higher than the industry's. (Our derivation; the knowledge base supplies the allegation.) This is the most fragile assumption in the price, and it is fragile in a specific way:
forward_guidancereports the same loan marked at 82 by Blackstone, 70 by Apollo and 91 by KKR. If that is representative, a repricing costs KKR more than its peers. The market has already discounted something here — 14.8x forward for an 18%-growth fee business is not a clean-sheet multiple. - Global Atlantic's spread holds across $219 billion of insurance AUM. (Filing-disclosed scale; our extrapolation.) Global Atlantic is 29.4% of total AUM and its economics are, in the 10-Q's own words, "a spread between its investment income and the cost of policyholder benefits." That is credit risk with a duration mismatch, and it has not been tested through a full cycle since the 2021 acquisition.
- The return comes from the multiple and from earnings, because it cannot come from anywhere else. (Our number, from
cf_aandratios_ttm.) The dividend yield is 0.69% and fiscal 2025 share repurchases were $122.9 million — 0.13% of market capitalisation. Total shareholder yield is under 1%, against 5.3% at McKesson and 7.4% at Capital One in this same batch. There is no carry to collect while you wait. - The market eventually pays more than 14.8x. (Our number.) At 12x FY2027E the stock is $88; at 20x it is $147. The whole valuation case is the assertion that 14.8x is too low for this business, and it needs the crowd to change its mind — which is a materially weaker structural position than a return built on yield.
3b. The return bridge (why the multiple moves)
Expected return over the next twelve months decomposes as: adjusted earnings growth (+18.0%, from FY2026E $6.213 to FY2027E $7.334) + multiple EXPANSION (14.8x on the forward year moving toward roughly 17x, +15%) + shareholder yield (+0.7%) — but that double-counts, because a 17x multiple on the FY2027 number IS the $125 base. Stated cleanly: the base case is that KKR earns the consensus $7.334 in FY2027 and the market pays 17x for it, which is $125, or +15.5% from spot, plus a 0.69% dividend.
This dive's return therefore REQUIRES multiple expansion, and we flag that as the fragile leg rather than burying it. If the multiple simply holds at 14.8x on the FY2027 number, the price is $108.5 — spot. Earnings growth alone does not get you paid here, because the growth is already being applied to a forward year the market is already discounting.
That is the opposite of the Capital One structure in this same batch, where roughly half the return was shareholder yield and none of it required a re-rating. A return that needs the crowd to change its mind is a lower-quality return, and it is the second reason this is Tactical rather than Core.
What would drive the expansion, concretely: a private-credit cycle that does not turn; two more quarters of double-digit adjusted-earnings beats; K-Series retail AUM compounding past $38 billion; and the simple passage of time restoring a multiple this business held before a 35% drawdown. What would prevent it: any of the four bearish knowledge-base claims proving right.
If the multiple compressed to 12x FY2027E the price is $88 (−18.7%). If it expanded to 20x, $147 (+35.8%).
3c. Variant perception (where we differ, what would surprise)
- We are 6.5% BELOW the street's mean and essentially AT its median. Our $125 against a consensus $133.67 and a median $126, with 24 of 27 analysts at buy and none at sell, and a low target of $116 that is itself 7.2% above spot. When the entire covering universe is at buy on a stock that has lost 24% in a year, the more useful information is in the price than in the ratings, and we sit at the median rather than the mean deliberately.
- We think the insider buying is the highest-quality information in this file and it is not in any screen. Six open-market purchases by five people — both co-chief executives and three directors — totalling roughly $23.2 million between 2026-02-17 and 2026-03-04, at $87.81 to $103.17. Not one is a tax-withholding disposal or an option exercise; every one is a P-Purchase. Watchable event: whether this pattern resumes after the 2026-07-30 print. Its absence would be as informative as its presence was.
- We think the private-credit bear case is real, partially priced, and specifically testable. Four independent channels raise it and one raises it in checkable form. Watchable number: any disclosure of KKR's credit marks relative to peers on commonly-held positions. The claim that KKR carries 91 where Blackstone carries 82 and Apollo carries 70 is either representative or it is not, and it is the kind of thing that becomes visible in a downturn rather than in a filing.
- We differ from the vendor data on almost everything, which is itself the variant. Enterprise value, net debt, book value per share, price-to-book, every leverage ratio, the composite rating,
seg_geo,seg_prodand three of sixearn_calrows are rejected in Section 8. The vendor reports fiscal-2025 cash of $6.155 MILLION for a company that held $14,878 million a year earlier. Anyone screening KKR on this file is looking at a company with no cash, 122% of revenue in three segments, no geography, a D+ rating and a 32x P/E. None of that is true. - Positive surprise that would force a re-rate: a share repurchase programme of consequence. The co-CEOs are buying personally at 14.8x forward while the company bought back $122.9 million — 0.13% of itself — in a full year. A billion-dollar authorisation used would be worth roughly a point of yield and, more importantly, a statement about what management thinks the marks are worth. Second: K-Series AUM through $50 billion, which would move the retail thesis from promising to established.
- Negative surprise that would break the thesis: a markdown cycle in private credit that hits KKR harder than peers; a Global Atlantic reserve charge; realised performance income falling sharply as the exit window closes; a quarter in which fee-related earnings — the recurring half — declines; or insider selling by the same people who bought in February.
Synthos fair values
All three anchors are multiples of the FY2027 consensus adjusted net income per share distribution (mean $7.334, low $6.872, high $7.579, 11 analysts).
- Bear ~$82 — 11.9x the FY2027 consensus LOW of $6.872, cross-checked at 13.7x FY2026E. 2.2% BELOW the 52-week low of $83.88. The scenario: the private-credit cycle turns, KKR's marks prove to have been the industry's most optimistic, Global Atlantic takes a reserve charge, realisations stop, and the multiple goes to a trough level on trough earnings. −24.2%.
- Base ~$125 — 17.0x the FY2027 consensus MEAN of $7.334, cross-checked at 20.1x FY2026E and 14.7x FY2028E. Sensitivity, stated openly: 14.8x gives $108.5 — exactly spot — and 20x gives $147. The entire base case is the assertion that 14.8x is too low, and it lives inside a 15-20x band on one estimate row. The scenario: consensus delivers, marks hold, K-Series compounds, and the multiple recovers to roughly where it sat before the drawdown. +15.5%.
- Bull ~$165 — 21.8x the FY2027 consensus HIGH of $7.579, cross-checked at 19.4x FY2028E. 10.5% above the 52-week high of $149.34. The scenario: credit fears prove unfounded, retail distribution scales, Global Atlantic's spread widens, and the market pays a growth multiple for a fee business with permanent capital. +52.5%.
Base is 15.5% above spot; asymmetry roughly 2.17:1 to the upside (24.2% down, 52.5% up), before a shareholder yield of approximately 0.7%, which is negligible. A base above 15% and a payoff ratio above 2:1 clears the Tactical bar. What keeps it out of Core is set out in Section 6.
4. Knowledge base — nine hits, six used, and four of the six are bearish
Raw hits: 9. Entity matches: 5. Free-text hits: 4. Used: 6. Discarded: 3. Distinct channels in the used lane: 5.
The sweep ran case-sensitive entity tokens KKR and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, plus case-sensitive free-text patterns for both, across all 51,928 distilled claims. The homograph risk on a three-letter ticker did not materialise: every one of the nine hits concerns the firm, and nothing was discarded for noise.
The four bearish claims, verbatim:
> 2026-03-30 · bearish · conviction 70 · horizon: thesis · entities: KKR, BX · channel: anthony_pompliano_show · speaker: Larry McDonald · speaker_role: independent
> "With ~60% of private equity leveraged, private credit above it cramps down PE value — KKR, Blackstone already down 40-60%."
> 2026-04-14 · bearish · conviction 70 · skill 0.7 · horizon: thesis · entities: Blue Owl, KKR · channel: eurodollar_university · speaker: null
> "Private credit managers like Blue Owl and KKR exhibit bubble behavior; Blue Owl's loud protests only draw more attention to the bubble."
> 2026-03-06 · bearish · conviction 65 · horizon: fact · entities: Campbell Soup, KKR, Huntington Bancshares, CBRE, Ares Management · channel: compound_and_friends · speaker: null
> "Credit-exposed names (KKR, CBRE, Ares, Huntington) plus Campbell Soup are the worst breakdowns on the negative-momentum list right now."
> 2025-11-14 · bearish · conviction 70 · horizon: thesis · entities: [none] · channel: forward_guidance · speaker: null
> "Private credit marks are diverging on the same loan (Blackstone 82, Apollo 70, KKR 91), echoing rising non-performing assets pre-2007-08 subprime crisis."
The one bull, the one structural positive, and the neutral:
> 2026-03-06 · bullish · conviction 60 · horizon: thesis · entities: KKR · channel: compound_and_friends · speaker: null
> "KKR is a phenomenal company to own — but only after the next round of QE, since money-printing lifts the financialized economy's financial sector."
> 2024-09-04 · bullish · conviction 65 · horizon: thesis · entities: [none] · channel: real_vision · speaker: null
> "Alt managers (Apollo, KKR, Blackstone) target retail because defined-benefit pools are shrinking while US retail wealth grows ~13-17% annually — a structural distribution shift."
> 2025-03-26 · neutral · conviction 55 · horizon: thesis · entities: Apollo, APO, Blackstone, BX, KKR, Carlyle · channel: business_breakdowns · speaker: null
> "Founder-succession execution differentiates alt managers; Apollo nearly fumbled it but de-risked into Mark Rowan, who is reshaping the firm as an evangelist-CEO."
What this lane is, stated without inflation. It is genuinely multi-sourced, genuinely recent, and genuinely negative. Five distinct channels — anthony_pompliano_show, eurodollar_university, compound_and_friends, forward_guidance and real_vision — and four of the six used claims are bearish, three of them dated within the last five months. They converge on one thing: private credit valuation. This is not a diffuse macro overlay of the kind discarded on other names; it names KKR and it names the mechanism.
The single most useful claim is forward_guidance's. "Blackstone 82, Apollo 70, KKR 91" on the same loan is a specific, falsifiable, checkable allegation that KKR carries the most optimistic mark in the peer set. We hold no independent verification of it and the filings in this archive do not address it. But it is exactly the kind of claim a research process exists to surface, and it converts a vague worry into a watchable variable.
Three claims discarded, with reasons:
empire, 2023-02-06 (neutral, conviction 55, entities Polygon and Avalanche): mentions "KKR funds" only as an example of Avalanche's institutional-tokenisation business development. Not a view on the security; discarded.jacob_shapiro, 2023-10-17 (bullish, conviction 72, speaker David Petraeus): defence-spending claim referencing "a core KKR 'weaponization of everything' theme." This is a KKR research theme being cited, not a view on KKR's shares; discarded. Note the speaker is named and is a genuine authority on the subject matter — the discard is about relevance, not credibility.- The
business_breakdownssuccession claim is retained but scored neutral, since it is about the alt-manager category and its specific content concerns Apollo rather than KKR.
Concentration test — run and PASSED. The used lane draws on five distinct channels with a maximum single-channel share of two claims out of six (33%, compound_and_friends) — and those two point in opposite directions, one bearish on momentum and one conditionally bullish on the company. No channel dominates and no commercially interested party appears. This is the healthiest lane structure in this batch.
Attribution note. Five of the six used claims carry speaker: null and are channel-attributed. The one named speaker is Larry McDonald, appearing on anthony_pompliano_show. Under the standing weighting rule the host's own voice is discounted as promoter-class; a guest is first-class, and this claim is treated as such. No management voice appears anywhere in this lane — there is no claim attributable to KKR's own executives, which is the correct state and is recorded.
Conclusion. Breadth 5, claim count 6, net conviction negative-moderate. The Synthos knowledge base is net bearish on KKR, on a specific and coherent thesis about private-credit valuation, from four independent channels. That view has been RIGHT over the horizon that has elapsed — the stock is down 24.1% in twelve months and drew down 35.2%. It is also, at 14.8x forward, substantially in the price. The verdict is a judgment that it is more than substantially in the price, and the lane is why that judgment is Tactical and carries credit-based kill criteria.
5. Insiders — six open-market purchases, both co-CEOs, all below today's price
| Date | Person | Role | Type | Shares | Price | Value | Held after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-17 | Joseph Y. Bae | Director, Co-Chief Executive Officer | P-Purchase | 30,082 | $103.17 | ~$3.10M | 509,257 |
| 2026-02-17 | Matt Cohler | Director | P-Purchase | 43,872 | $102.90 | ~$4.51M | 45,477 |
| 2026-02-27 | Scott C. Nuttall | Director, Co-Chief Executive Officer | P-Purchase | 50,000 | $87.81 | ~$4.39M | 14,406,748 |
| 2026-02-27 | Joseph Y. Bae | Director, Co-Chief Executive Officer | P-Purchase | 50,000 | $88.56 | ~$4.43M | 559,257 |
| 2026-03-02 | Mary N. Dillon | Director | P-Purchase | 22,225 | $90.96 | ~$2.02M | 49,610 |
| 2026-03-04 | Timothy R. Barakett | Director | P-Purchase | 50,000 | $94.47 | ~$4.72M | 285,000 |
| 2026-04-29 | Robert H. Lewin | Chief Financial Officer | A-Award (Restricted Holdings Units) | 650,000 | $0 | — | 650,000 |
| 2026-04-29 | Kathryn King Sudol | Chief Legal Officer & GC | A-Award (Restricted Holdings Units) | 300,000 | $0 | — | 300,000 |
Total open-market purchases: 246,179 shares, approximately $23.2 million, across five people in sixteen days.
This is the strongest insider signal in this batch and it deserves to be read carefully rather than celebrated.
What makes it strong. Every one of the six transactions is a P-Purchase — an open-market acquisition with the buyer's own money. There is not one S-Sale in the file. Both co-chief executives bought, Joseph Bae twice. Three independent directors bought. The purchases cluster in a sixteen-day window at the bottom of the drawdown, at $87.81 to $103.17 — every price below today's $108.21, and Nuttall's and Bae's 2026-02-27 purchases at $87.81 and $88.56 are within 5% of the 52-week low of $83.88. These are people who see the private-credit marks the knowledge base is worried about, buying at the moment the market was most worried about them.
What qualifies it. Scott Nuttall already held 14,406,748 shares before buying 50,000 — his purchase increased his holding by 0.35%, and $4.4 million is a small figure against a position worth roughly $1.6 billion. For him this is a signal, not a bet. Joseph Bae's two purchases took him from 479,175 to 559,257 shares, a 16.7% increase, which is proportionally far more meaningful. Matt Cohler's 43,872 shares took him from 1,605 to 45,477 — a 27-fold increase and effectively a new position. Mary Dillon's 22,225 took her from 27,385 to 49,610, an 81% increase. Three of the six purchases are large relative to the buyer's existing holding, which is the version of this signal that carries information.
Two further qualifications. Several are marked "I" (indirect) ownership — Bae, Dillon and Barakett — meaning the shares are held through a trust or family vehicle rather than directly; that is normal and does not diminish the transaction. And the two April awards to the chief financial officer and chief legal officer are Restricted Holdings Units granted at zero cost — compensation, not conviction, and they are excluded from the reading.
What the file does not contain: any transaction by Henry Kravis or George Roberts. No purchase, no sale.
The honest summary: six open-market purchases by five people including both chief executives, roughly $23.2 million, all below today's price, clustered at the low. It is the cleanest positive signal in this dive and it is not in any screen.
6. Data integrity — what we rejected and why
Eleven findings. This is the least usable vendor file in this batch, and the reason is structural: a fund manager that consolidates an insurance company and third-party financing vehicles breaks almost every ratio a standard pipeline computes.
1. Enterprise value, net debt and all derived measures are structurally inapplicable — REJECTED as a class, and the filing says why. The vendor prints enterpriseValueTTM of $142,689M, netDebtToEBITDATTM of 4.82x, evToSalesTTM of 6.76x, evToEBITDATTM of 15.12x, debtToEquityRatioTTM of 1.80x, financialLeverageRatioTTM of 13.51x and interestCoverageRatioTTM of 1.19x. All of these treat the debt of consolidated collateralised financing entities and Global Atlantic as KKR's leverage. The 10-Q states: "Debt securities issued by CFEs are supported solely by the assets held at the CFEs and are not collateralized by assets of any other KKR entity... The CFE's debt obligations are non-recourse to KKR beyond the assets of the CFE." And: "These borrowings are non-recourse to KKR beyond the investments or assets serving as collateral." This is the DE captive-finance and PGR insurer rejection class, and it is more severe than either. None of these measures is used.
2. Enterprise value ALSO omits $50,729,350,000 of noncontrolling interests — the largest NCI omission in this programme. Total equity is $81,632M, of which $50,729M (62.1%) is noncontrolling interests. Adding NCI to the vendor's EV gives $193,419M, a 35.6% increase. For comparison, the SPGI case that established this defect class was a 3.9% understatement. We record the arithmetic and then reject the corrected figure too, for the reason in finding 1 — a correct enterprise value for an entity like this is still not a meaningful number.
3. bal_a reports fiscal-2025 cash of $6,155,000 — SIX MILLION DOLLARS — for a company that held $14,878 million a year earlier. The full row is cashAndCashEquivalents $6,155,000, shortTermInvestments $0, against FY2024's $14,878,493,000 and $97,679,197,000 respectively. netDebt of $54,759,678,000 is computed as total debt less that six million dollars. Two independent checks show it is wrong: ratios_ttm.cashPerShareTTM of $10.401 implies roughly $9.3 billion of cash on the same share base, and km_ttm.currentRatioTTM of 10.06 is incompatible with near-zero cash. The same row also reports totalCurrentLiabilities of $892,207,000 against $53,074,454,000 a year earlier — a 98.3% fall. The fiscal-2025 balance-sheet classification in this payload is broken, and every net-debt, liquidity and current-ratio measure derived from it is discarded.
4. goodwill goes from $1,019,533,000 (FY2024) to $0 (FY2025) while intangibleAssets rises from $7,000,471,000 to $8,781,973,000. Goodwill does not vanish; it is either impaired (which would be a disclosed charge) or reclassified. We treat this as a reclassification within the payload rather than an economic event, note that goodwillAndIntangibleAssets rose from $8,020M to $8,782M across the same period, and do not use the goodwill line.
5. bookValuePerShareTTM includes noncontrolling interests AND preferred stock — the price-to-book ratio is wrong by a wide margin. The vendor reports bookValuePerShareTTM of $90.227 and priceToBookRatioTTM of 3.178x. But shareholdersEquityPerShareTTM is $34.052 — a $56.18 difference, which is the $50.7 billion of NCI spread across the share base. KKR's common equity is total stockholders' equity of $30,903M less preferred stock of $2,543M = $28,360M, or approximately $29.67 per share on the market-capitalisation-implied count — giving a true price-to-book of approximately 3.65x, not 3.18x. tangibleBookValuePerShareTTM of $83.607 carries the same defect. This is the same class of error as the USB preferred omission elsewhere in this batch, compounded by an NCI omission fourteen times larger.
6. earn_cal MIXES TWO REVENUE BASES ACROSS ITS SIX ROWS, manufacturing apparent revenue beats of 181% and 153%. This is the defect class that caught MO across an excise-tax presentation change and APP across a divestiture, and here it is in a single six-row block:
| Report date | revenueActual | revenueEstimated | apparent variance | basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-31 | $5,002,879,000 | $1,778,764,852 | +181.3% | GAAP consolidated |
| 2025-11-07 | $5,464,926,000 | $2,157,256,649 | +153.3% | GAAP consolidated |
| 2026-02-05 | $1,635,626,000 | $1,820,530,000 | −10.2% | segment |
| 2026-05-05 | $2,346,840,000 | $2,180,605,000 | +7.6% | segment |
| 2026-07-30 | $2,763,185,000 | $2,547,923,000 | +8.4% | segment |
The two 2025 revenueActual figures match inc_q GAAP revenue for the same quarters EXACTLY ($5,002,879,000 and $5,464,926,000). The three 2026 figures do not — Q2 2026 GAAP revenue is $6,130,145,000 against the calendar's $2,763,185,000. The estimates are on the segment basis throughout. So the two oldest rows compare a GAAP number to a segment estimate and report beats of 181% and 153% that did not happen. Only the three 2026 rows are usable and only those are quoted in this dive. The EPS column is unaffected: all six rows are on the adjusted-net-income-per-share basis and reconcile to est.epsAvg.
7. seg_prod sums to 122.3% of revenue in fiscal 2025 through an evident double-count — REJECTED. The FY2025 entry contains "Insurance Segment $11,628,799,000", "Asset Management And Strategic Holdings Segments $7,835,508,000" and "Asset Management Segment $4,100,841,000" — summing to $23,565M against reported revenue of $19,262M. A line named "Asset Management And Strategic Holdings Segments" and a separate line named "Asset Management Segment" cannot both be additive. FY2024 ($21,878M against $21,640M, 101.1%) and FY2023 ($14,499M against $14,323M, 101.2%) are within a plausible elimination margin; FY2025 is not. The pre-2021 entries are worse, mixing fee categories with segments and including a negative "Fee Credit" line. No segment dollar figure in this dive comes from the payload.
8. seg_geo is EMPTY — zero entries, for any year. There is no geographic revenue disclosure for KKR in the payload at all. We report it as empty rather than substituting anything. The only geographic datum available is the 10-K's statement that KKR operates "a global operation with 36 offices around the world as of December 31, 2025."
9. est.ebitdaAvg and est.ebitAvg fail three tests — REJECTED. They are identical to the dollar in five of eight years; ebitAvg EXCEEDS ebitdaAvg in FY2023 ($3,488.5M against $2,967.6M), the arithmetically-impossible defect measured at 8.9% of files across the programme; and both carry the fixed-ratio signature, ebitdaAvg being exactly 52.573% of revenueAvg in every forward year. Separately, est.revenueAvg is non-monotonic — FY2029's $9,738M is 41% BELOW FY2028's $16,580M — and is on a segment basis roughly 2.4x below the GAAP revenue in inc_a. Neither the EBITDA/EBIT block nor the revenue block is used anywhere. All valuation runs on epsAvg, cross-checked against the three usable earn_cal rows.
10. The vendor composite rating is D+ / 1 overall with ONE OUT OF FIVE on every single sub-score — REJECTED in its entirety. Discounted cash flow 1, return on equity 1, return on assets 1, debt-to-equity 1, price-to-earnings 1, price-to-book 1. Every one of those is a mechanical consequence of the consolidation described in finding 1: a $410 billion balance sheet that mostly belongs to third parties produces a 0.76% return on assets, a 13.5x financial leverage ratio and a 32x GAAP P/E. A uniform 1-out-of-5 on a company that 24 of 27 covering analysts rate a buy, whose co-chief executives just bought $9 million of stock, is a measurement artefact and would invert the conclusion if treated as a signal.
11. The share count is on two different bases — the BX defect class. Market capitalisation ÷ price gives 897.9M shares, and ratios_ttm.revenuePerShareTTM of $23.579 against trailing GAAP revenue of $21,117M implies 895.6M — consistent. But inc_a.weightedAverageShsOutDil for FY2025 is 955,757,000, 6.5% higher. The gap is KKR Holdings exchangeable units, which are included in the GAAP diluted count and not in the Class A market capitalisation. This is exactly the Blackstone error the programme has previously caught — market capitalisation struck on one class while ratios use another. Here the ratios and the market capitalisation agree with each other and only the GAAP diluted count differs, which is the less harmful direction — but per-share GAAP figures and market-capitalisation-derived figures are NOT on the same base, and priceToEarningsDilutedRatioTTM (34.03x) versus priceToEarningsRatioTTM (32.21x) is the visible symptom.
Also checked and recorded. depreciationAndAmortization is exactly zero in all six years of inc_a and all four years of cf_a, for a company carrying $8.78 billion of intangible assets — the line is unpopulated, which makes capexToDepreciationTTM of 4.252 uninterpretable and contributes to the ebitdaAvg == ebitAvg identity in finding 9. quote.yearHigh/yearLow ($152.10 / $82.67) against tech.hi52/lo52 ($149.34 / $83.88) — a 1.8% and 1.5% discrepancy; tech is used throughout for internal consistency. dividendPerShareTTM of $0.75 matches lastDividend; dividendPayoutRatioTTM of 26.0% is computed against GAAP earnings and is therefore roughly double the payout against adjusted earnings (0.75 ÷ 5.55 = 13.5%).
returnOnEquityTTM — source stated. Present in km_ttm at 0.10562 (10.56%) and absent from ratios_ttm. We report it once and use it nowhere, because the denominator is the $30.9 billion of total stockholders' equity that includes $2.5 billion of preferred and excludes nothing of the consolidation problem.
Non-equity tripwire — checked and passed. KKR & Co. Inc. is common stock, NYSE-listed. Price of $108.21 is not par-like; beta is 1.794, the highest in this batch; the dividend is small and variable ($0.75, 0.69%); volume was 4.88M shares (~$528M of turnover); the 52-week band of $83.88 to $149.34 is a 78% range. Note the $2,543,404,000 of preferred stock on the fiscal-2025 balance sheet, which is NOT this security. This is common equity.
7. Technicals
- Price $108.21. −27.5% from the 52-week high of $149.34; +29.0% above the 52-week low of $83.88. Position within the annual range: 37th percentile.
- Above both moving averages, and the recovery in the shorter one is steep: +12.2% above a 50-day average of $96.47; +1.1% above a 200-day average of $107.01. The 200-day has just been reclaimed, which is the most informative technical fact here — the stock spent months below it.
- RSI 62.6 — the second-highest in this batch, strong without being overbought. MACD +2.38.
- Maximum drawdown from peak over the trailing year: −35.2% — by far the deepest in this batch, against a current position 27.5% below the high. The recovery off the low is 29.0%, so a meaningful part of the damage has already been repaired.
- Relative performance, and it is the worst in this batch by a wide margin: 3-month +4.7% against SPY +7.6% and QQQ +7.7%; 6-month −5.4% against SPY +11.1% and QQQ +15.7%; 12-month −24.1% against SPY +24.3% and QQQ +30.8% — a 48-point deficit against the S&P over twelve months. That is the valuation opportunity and the warning in the same number. Adjusted earnings grew over the same period; the entire move was de-rating.
- Sentiment: 0 strong buy, 24 buy, 3 hold, 0 sell across 27 analysts; consensus target $133.67 (+23.5%), median $126 (+16.4%), high $187 (+72.8%), low $116 — 7.2% ABOVE spot. Not one covering analyst has a sell rating or a target below the current price on a stock that has lost a quarter of its value in a year. The dispersion is the interesting part: a $187 high against a $116 low is a 61% spread, the widest in this batch, and it is an honest reflection of how much the answer depends on what private-credit marks turn out to be worth.
Today's move and what it does to the entry
KKR closed 2026-08-04 at $108.21, up 1.55% or $1.65 from $106.56. It opened at $105.40, traded $104.35 to $108.37, and closed within 0.15% of the day high on 4.88M shares. No company-specific filing is dated 2026-08-04; the last events were the 2026-07-30 earnings release and the 2026-07-31 credit-agreement 8-K.
The honest read: this is a recovery in progress, not a bottom being called. The stock has risen 29.0% off its low, reclaimed its 200-day average and closed at the day high. We are not buying the bottom — the people who bought the bottom were the co-chief executives in February, 19% lower. What we are buying is a business at 14.8x its second forward year after a 35% drawdown, with the recovery underway and the insiders already positioned.
That distinction governs the sizing. A Tactical position taken into a recovering downtrend should be built in stages, and the kill criteria in Section 8 are all credit and mark-related because the chart will not warn about a markdown cycle.
8. Verdict, kill-criteria and flip conditions
Buy — Tactical.
The arithmetic. At $108.21 KKR trades at 17.4x the FY2026 consensus of $6.213 and 14.8x FY2027's $7.334, having grown trailing adjusted net income per share to $5.55 and beaten consensus in four of five quarters, most recently by 14.0%. Our base fair value of $125 is 15.5% above spot with 2.17:1 asymmetry, and sits 6.5% below the street's $133.67 and essentially at its $126 median.
The entry. The stock is 27.5% below its 52-week high, has drawn down 35.2% from peak, and has underperformed the S&P by 48 points over twelve months while adjusted earnings grew. The entire move was de-rating. It has now reclaimed its 200-day average with RSI at 62.6.
The insiders. Six open-market purchases by five people — both co-chief executives and three directors — totalling approximately $23.2 million between 2026-02-17 and 2026-03-04, at $87.81 to $103.17. Every price below today's. Not one sale in the file. Three of the six increased the buyer's holding by 17% to 27-fold. This is the strongest insider signal in this batch and it is not in any screen.
Why Tactical and not Core, stated as four specific reservations.
First, the return requires multiple expansion. At 14.8x FY2027 held flat, the price is $108.5 — spot. The base case is the assertion that 14.8x is too low, which means the crowd has to change its mind. That is a structurally weaker basis than a return built on earnings and yield, and it is the opposite of the Capital One structure that earned the Tactical tier earlier in this batch on the strength of a 7.4% shareholder yield.
Second, there is no yield to pay you for waiting. The dividend is 0.69% and fiscal 2025 buybacks were $122.9 million — 0.13% of market capitalisation. Total shareholder yield is under 1%. If the re-rating takes three years instead of one, you have earned two percent.
Third, the knowledge base is net bearish and it is right about the risk. Four independent channels, three of them within the last five months, all on private-credit valuation — including a specific claim that KKR carries a mark of 91 where Blackstone carries 82 and Apollo carries 70 on the same loan. That view has been correct over the elapsed horizon: the stock fell 24%. We judge it substantially priced at 14.8x; we do not judge it wrong.
Fourth, the data is close to unusable and that matters for monitoring, not just for analysis. Eleven findings in Section 6, including a balance sheet reporting $6.155 million of cash, an earnings calendar with two revenue bases, a segment block summing to 122% of revenue, an empty geography block and a composite rating of 1 out of 5 on every sub-score. A position in this name cannot be monitored on a screen; it has to be monitored on filings.
Pre-registered KILL criteria — what would take this to Watch or Avoid. Every one is a credit or mark metric, because that is the variable that decides this:
- Any disclosed markdown cycle in KKR's private-credit portfolio, or evidence corroborating that KKR's marks are systematically above peers on commonly-held positions.
- A Global Atlantic reserve charge or spread compression disclosure — $219 billion of insurance AUM is 29.4% of the firm and its economics are a credit spread.
- A quarter in which fee-related earnings DECLINE year on year. Fee-related earnings are the recurring, mark-independent half of the business; if they fall, the case is gone.
- Adjusted net income per share below $1.40 in any quarter, roughly 11% under the September consensus of $1.57.
- K-Series retail AUM flat or declining from $38 billion, which would remove the structural growth leg.
- Insider SELLING by any of the five people who bought in February and March. The purchase cluster is the strongest positive in this file; its reversal would be the strongest negative.
- A drawdown back below the 50-day average of $96.47 on credit-specific news rather than market beta.
Pre-registered UPGRADE conditions — what would take this to Buy — Core:
- A share repurchase authorisation of consequence, actually used. The co-CEOs are buying personally at 14.8x forward while the company repurchased 0.13% of itself in a year. A programme worth 3-4% of market capitalisation annually would transform the return bridge from one that needs a re-rating into one that does not, which is precisely the distinction between the two Buy tiers.
- Two more quarters of double-digit adjusted-earnings beats with fee-related earnings growing, which would settle the question the bearish lane raises.
- K-Series retail AUM through $50 billion, moving the structural thesis from promising to established.
- Any peer-comparable disclosure of credit marks that rebuts the
forward_guidanceallegation. - Knowledge-base conviction turning neutral or positive. At present four of six claims are bearish and a Core rating against a coherent, multi-sourced, recently-correct bear thesis is not available.
Where KKR fits in the Synthos Framework Portfolio. The financials sleeve, entering at 1.5% today with a 3% target scaled on either a pullback toward the 50-day at $96 or a quarter of fee-related-earnings growth with no adverse mark disclosure. Sizing note, and it is the operative discipline: this is a levered bet on private-credit valuations wrapped in a fee business, held in a name that pays you under 1% a year to wait. Size it so that a second 35% drawdown is survivable, because there has already been one. Logged as a tracked Synthos call (Buy — Tactical) as of 2026-08-04 at $108.21, with the fair-value anchors, kill criteria and upgrade conditions all gradeable.
Single biggest risk: private-credit marks. KKR manages $744 billion, of which $219 billion sits inside an insurance company earning a spread on credit, and an unknown but substantial further share sits in private-credit funds whose assets are marked by the manager rather than by a market. Four independent voices in the knowledge base — anthony_pompliano_show (guest Larry McDonald), eurodollar_university, compound_and_friends and forward_guidance — have said since late 2025 that this market is mispriced, and one has said specifically that KKR's marks are the highest in the peer set. The stock's 24.1% twelve-month decline against a 24.3% market gain says a great deal of that concern is already reflected. What the price cannot tell us is whether 14.8x forward is a discount for a risk that does not materialise or a fair price for one that does. The company's own co-chief executives bought $9 million of stock at prices 19% below today's, which is the best available evidence on that question and is not proof. The kill criteria above are all mark-related for exactly that reason.
Provenance & disclosures
- Traceability: 6 knowledge-base claims are used on KKR out of 51,928 distilled claims (raw hits 9, entity matches 5, free-text hits 4, used 6, discarded 3; breadth 5, net conviction negative-moderate). FOUR OF THE SIX ARE BEARISH, from four distinct channels, all on private-credit valuation:
anthony_pompliano_show2026-03-30 (conviction 70, speaker Larry McDonald — a guest, therefore first-class under house policy rather than the promoter-class discount applied to the host's own voice, "With ~60% of private equity leveraged, private credit above it cramps down PE value — KKR, Blackstone already down 40-60%");eurodollar_university2026-04-14 (conviction 70, skill 0.7, "Private credit managers like Blue Owl and KKR exhibit bubble behavior");compound_and_friends2026-03-06 (conviction 65, "Credit-exposed names (KKR, CBRE, Ares, Huntington)... are the worst breakdowns on the negative-momentum list"); andforward_guidance2025-11-14 (conviction 70, "Private credit marks are diverging on the same loan (Blackstone 82, Apollo 70, KKR 91), echoing rising non-performing assets pre-2007-08 subprime crisis" — the single most useful and most checkable claim in the lane, alleging KKR carries the highest mark in the peer set). The two positives arecompound_and_friends2026-03-06 (conviction 60, conditional — "a phenomenal company to own — but only after the next round of QE") andreal_vision2024-09-04 (conviction 65, the structural retail-distribution thesis).business_breakdowns2025-03-26 is retained and scored neutral. THREE DISCARDED WITH REASONS:empire2023-02-06 (mentions "KKR funds" only as an example of Avalanche's tokenisation business development — not a view on the security) andjacob_shapiro2023-10-17 (David Petraeus citing "a core KKR 'weaponization of everything' theme" — a research theme, not a view on the security); both are relevance discards, not credibility discards. Homograph check on the three-letter ticker: run case-sensitively with word boundaries, and it did NOT fire — every one of the nine hits concerns the firm, which is unusual for a three-letter ticker and is recorded. Concentration sensitivity test — RUN and PASSED: five distinct channels in the used lane, maximum single-channel share two claims of six (33%), and those two point in opposite directions. Five of six used claims carryspeaker: nulland are channel-attributed; no management voice appears anywhere in this lane. All quotes are verbatim from the stored claim text. - Data as-of: fundamentals — segment definitions, AUM, K-Series retail AUM, fee-related-earnings drivers, realised-performance-income composition and the non-recourse language on consolidated financing entities through 2026-03-31, from the 10-Q filed 2026-05-08; total AUM of $744 billion and the $219 billion Global Atlantic figure from the 10-K filed 2026-02-27; the $3.0 billion revolver from the 8-K filed 2026-07-31 · estimates 2026-08-04 · prices 2026-08-04, quote timestamp 1785873603 = 2026-08-04T20:00:03Z ($108.21, +1.55%; 50-DMA $96.47; 200-DMA $107.01; RSI 62.6; MACD +2.38; max drawdown −35.2%) · knowledge-base claims 2026-08-04. KKR's fiscal year is the calendar year. All figures come from the Synthos vendor data file for KKR or from the SEC filings in the KKR archive; no figure comes from memory, recall or external retrieval.
- Filing archive contents: 10-K filed 2026-02-27 (fiscal 2025 — the source of the $744 billion AUM and $219 billion Global Atlantic figures); 10-Q filed 2025-11-07 (September 2025 quarter); 10-Q filed 2026-05-08 (March 2026 quarter — the source of the segment definitions, K-Series AUM, fee-related-earnings drivers, realised-exit names and the non-recourse language); 8-K filed 2026-05-29 (board election by KKR Management LLP: Kravis, Roberts, Bae, Nuttall, Arnold, Barakett, Cohler, Dillon, Niel, Ross, Russo); 8-K filed 2026-07-30 (Item 9.01 only — the second-quarter earnings release is an exhibit and is not in the extracted text); 8-K filed 2026-07-31 — a Fourth Amended and Restated Credit Agreement providing a $3.0 billion senior unsecured multicurrency revolving facility with a $750 million accordion, five-year, maturing 2031-07-30, guaranteed by KKR & Co. Inc., replacing the July 2024 facility. NO file in this archive contains a
[TABLE]marker — statement tables were not preserved for this name, verified bygrep -creturning zero on all six files. Every filing-sourced figure in this dive is therefore a prose statement in the 10-K or 10-Q, and no primary statement line item was independently verified against a preserved table. There is no June-quarter 10-Q. - Where the filings contradicted or corrected the vendor: the entire leverage and enterprise-value framework — the vendor's
netDebtof $54,759,678,000,enterpriseValueTTMof $142,689,460,946,netDebtToEBITDATTMof 4.82x andfinancialLeverageRatioTTMof 13.51x treat as KKR's leverage the debt of consolidated financing entities that the 10-Q states is "non-recourse to KKR beyond the assets of the CFE" and "non-recourse to KKR beyond the investments or assets serving as collateral"; the geographic and segment structure — the 10-Q's three reportable segments (Asset Management, Insurance, Strategic Holdings) againstseg_prod's FY2025 three lines summing to 122.3% of reported revenue through an evident double-count between "Asset Management And Strategic Holdings Segments" and "Asset Management Segment", and against a completely emptyseg_geo; and the corporate actions — the 2026-07-31 $3.0 billion revolving credit facility and the 2026-05-29 board election, neither of which appears in any vendor field. Where vendor and filing AGREED — recorded: theearn_calEPS column is on the adjusted-net-income-per-share basis throughout and reconciles toest.epsAvg(FY2025 estimate $4.931 against a quarterly-actual sum near the same level); and the two 2025revenueActualfigures matchinc_qGAAP revenue to the dollar, which is how the mixed-basis defect in finding 6 was identified. - Rejected as a class — the consolidation cascade:
enterpriseValueTTM($142,689M, which also omits $50,729M of noncontrolling interests, a 35.6% understatement and the largest NCI omission in this programme against the 3.9% SPGI case that established the class),netDebtToEBITDATTM(4.82x),evToSalesTTM(6.76x),evToEBITDATTM(15.12x),evToOperatingCashFlowTTM(20.21x),debtToEquityRatioTTM(1.80x),debtToCapitalRatioTTM(0.643),financialLeverageRatioTTM(13.51x),interestCoverageRatioTTM(1.19x),returnOnAssetsTTM(0.76%),returnOnCapitalEmployedTTM(0.91%),currentRatioTTM(10.06),netCurrentAssetValueTTM(−$321,963M),grahamNetNetTTM(−$359.50),priceToBookRatioTTM(3.178x — the correct figure on common equity is approximately 3.65x),bookValuePerShareTTM($90.227, which includes $50.7B of NCI and $2.5B of preferred) andtangibleBookValuePerShareTTM($83.607, same defect). The vendor composite rating (D+ / 1 overall, with ONE out of five on every sub-score) is rejected in its entirety as a mechanical artefact of the same consolidation. Also rejected: GAAPpriceToEarningsRatioTTM(32.21x) andpriceToEarningsDilutedRatioTTM(34.03x), because GAAP net income swung from −$186M to +$1,146M in three quarters and neither KKR nor any analyst in this file forecasts it; the entireestEBITDA/EBIT block (identical to the dollar in five of eight years,ebitAvgEXCEEDINGebitdaAvgin FY2023, and a fixed 52.573% of revenue in every forward year); and the entireestrevenue block (non-monotonic — FY2029's $9,738M is 41% below FY2028's $16,580M — and on a basis 2.4x belowinc_a). - Balance-sheet data flags, recorded separately because they are single-line errors rather than structural ones:
bal_afiscal 2025 reportscashAndCashEquivalentsof $6,155,000 — six million dollars — against $14,878,493,000 a year earlier, withshortTermInvestmentsof $0 against $97,679,197,000, andtotalCurrentLiabilitiesof $892,207,000 against $53,074,454,000; two independent checks contradict it (cashPerShareTTMof $10.401 implies roughly $9.3 billion, andcurrentRatioTTMof 10.06 is incompatible with near-zero cash).goodwillfalls from $1,019,533,000 to $0 whileintangibleAssetsrises from $7,000,471,000 to $8,781,973,000 — treated as a reclassification, not an impairment, and not used.depreciationAndAmortizationis exactly zero in all six years ofinc_aand all four years ofcf_afor a company carrying $8.78 billion of intangibles. - Share-count basis — the BX defect class: market capitalisation ÷ price gives 897.9M shares and
revenuePerShareTTMimplies 895.6M, butinc_a.weightedAverageShsOutDilfor FY2025 is 955,757,000, 6.5% higher, the gap being KKR Holdings exchangeable units included in the GAAP diluted count and not in the Class A market capitalisation. Per-share GAAP figures and market-capitalisation-derived figures are not on the same base, and the visible symptom ispriceToEarningsDilutedRatioTTM(34.03x) againstpriceToEarningsRatioTTM(32.21x). Here the ratios block and the market capitalisation agree with each other, which is the less harmful direction than the original BX case. returnOnEquityTTM— source stated: present inkm_ttmat 10.56% and absent fromratios_ttm. Reported once and used nowhere, because the denominator includes $2.5 billion of preferred and none of the consolidation problem is resolved by it.- Estimate coverage: 10 analysts on FY2026 and 11 on FY2027 adjusted net income per share — the anchor for all three fair values, with an FY2027 range of $6.872 to $7.579 (10.3%); only 2 on FY2028, used for cross-check only; and 1 on FY2029, excluded from every conclusion. Revenue estimates are not used at all, for the reasons above.
- Peer note: the vendor peer set is the cleanest in this batch — Apollo, Ares Management, Blackstone, Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, Carlyle, Blue Owl and TPG are eight genuine alternative-asset-manager comparables, with BlackRock, T. Rowe Price, AMG, Ares Capital and Carlyle Secured Lending being traditional managers or BDCs. At $97.2B market capitalisation KKR sits between Apollo ($76.8B) and Blackstone ($108.1B). No cross-multiple is drawn, because this file contains no equivalent adjusted-earnings data for the peers and inventing one would be a fabrication.
- Fair-value caveat: the $82 / $125 / $165 anchors are multiples of the FY2027 consensus adjusted net income per share distribution — 11.9x the low of $6.872, 17.0x the mean of $7.334, and 21.8x the high of $7.579. Stated arithmetic, not a discounted cash flow. No book-value cross-check is applied, because the only book-value figures in the file include $50.7 billion of noncontrolling interests. The base is sensitivity-disclosed: 14.8x — the current multiple held flat — gives $108.5, which is spot; 20x gives $147. The base case therefore REQUIRES multiple expansion, and that is flagged in Section 3b as the fragile leg rather than buried: earnings growth alone does not get you paid here.
- Timing: second-quarter 2026 results were released 2026-07-30, five days before this dive, and beat the consensus estimate by 14.0% ($1.63 against $1.43) on segment revenue of $2,763M against $2,548M (+8.4%). The next print is 2026-11-06, 94 days away (consensus $1.57, segment revenue $2,738M). The most recent insider transactions are the 2026-04-29 restricted-unit awards to the chief financial officer and chief legal officer; the six open-market purchases all fall between 2026-02-17 and 2026-03-04. 2026-08-04 carried no company-specific filing.
- Accessibility note: no information in this dive is conveyed by colour. All emphasis is carried by bold text, table structure and explicit labelling.
- Not investment advice. Independent research, educational and informational only, never personalised. No recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security is made to any person.
- Version: 2026-08-04-full.